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••••it h the pQHcy of Comet! University odively to support eq~aHty
of educotiono-: e;nd employment opportunity. No person sha.H be
denied0:4missloll to 9ft)' edtl-'Cation~l !=,rogrom o-r activHy or be
def:'l!*d e,m'pJoym~rd on the bo~i!> of Qr,y fe;gaHy prohiblred cHs--
crim:ttH':$Horr ftlvolving, but not Hmited te-, SUCH roc-tors ca rqce,
colol', cl'eed, i"e!igkm, (lotio-Ani OJ' ethnic origin, $ex" age Of
hondkap. The Unive-rshy k; i:omroith~-d to the r.Hl-;nt'&IH:H~Ce of
affirmative action progroms whkh wHi ~SSiJre Hm continuation
of such equality of opp.ortunlty,RETHINKING CONTRACTS FOR PURCHASING POWER: THE





rh~tPmP(j~e Qf t:P:is' ,:art:h~le is' to'ey~~~~¢and.. c-offlpa~ -t4e inp(~me1::l:Jal' cost of
P9r~ba:sedp~yier _f~nl'n~~-utilftYgen~rat6rsversus- utility. built generatiQnconsldering a
variety ofcontracts for energy purchases. Four types ofcontracts are evaluated: 1) Flat Rate
Produce art~,' ~ay , 2) Qn-PeaklOff--Peak, 3) :Basic Dispatchable, and 4) Aetual Cycle
EJ1erg.y Oi$pat~ll.. ~he tYpe of contiact can ~~t the co:mpetit~ven~ss of;~~~~tricrates
t~~ll:g~ J~cte-~s~d '~n~rgy pr;oduct~p:n ,co.~ts,~ 'W¢U'as incre:ase4 risks, in'terms',of>fina.ncial
lia9:ilHy, affee~il1:g,-the cost of ~ept:_tQJbepurchaiing, utility. ,An analysis conducted for a
,rept~se~tative ~n:lj~y c,~culates, :!ll~',effe,9ts ofNUG po~~r. ,p~rcb~~$>t>n ,a u;t¥liitylg ene(gy
prqd.uction::c~sts, :aud:'nJe, 'Q,ost ,o-:f.-I~e:w debt, :j$su~~es. .- :Di,spatc:flabl~ ':en.ergy cQntracts,ate
~hown :'tQ pr~vi~e'~~gniii6~t .ecoti~c ahd operating adv~tages ()v~r ~Hlt'Rateana On-
Peak10ff-Pe~,e~~rgy 'CQntracts. In additi:on~an example shows thatNUG putr;hases based
ontheactual the~ cycle and fuel costs for disp~tch cost less than utility-buIlt gene-ration
financed at the-utility's weight-edaverage cost of' c~pit~. NUO's~~" ~$-Q shown to act as
e.xtemal m~bilmetits 'that increase ,a utility's leverag~'andresult in a bigbttr cost ofdebt for
the utility. Ho~eve:r~ ~s incre~eis 'les,s th:~ the fInance costsfor an identical facility built
by the utility. NUG contracts for a u:tility which aIreadyhas significant risk e,,:posure are
sh9wn to P~_"~ papit~ ~:~e,. Utl~:the;seeonditiofts,,additional paymentobligations to
NtJGs increase tl1e cost ofnew debtissuances making an equity issuance for utility built
capacity a mote attractive option.
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Theeconomic'and operatihnafcOntractmechanisms use4 inlong,term,powerpurchase
arrartgeDi~nts hat'ri'a:dlte~t 'i:mpa~t :on ei~ctri~" ra:i~~' :~d'< ~tiiity ~r~di~ ~~ti~~~~ 1: "Po~er
contract~ executed'hi; th~" electric utilitY'industry t~y often fal,I to i~~egr~~e'the contra~ted ':
-- :, --.: .. ,<' j:, ..: c,':' ., ,,:,,>,: :,",', -- ,,:., ,''''.. '-",:, , ',"
resource efficiently wIth a'utility's exi~ting resources or address the concerns of the
fmab~ia1~&nkrihitY.':This i~ pakibularly fhl~'~~~~ l~ng~'run'co~~~ts:~ ~ritten'~~ly'for;""
deli~~i~a"~ner~. Jh ~ 1~90"E~e;g; j~~/~~l~',title(r !'7h~ Efn~ient DeSi~ '~~Co~~~~ ,,
To ~tch~~bl~iiet<i~d ~~ZV~;";ftltIlliri~i~~~~F~~~r;¢Q~~tu;;I;tnli1t~~~ to ...
prQy:~4~:~:~~~Q;ti1itygefieratotS(Nudges}\"Vith a' financial ince~:tiv:e to':petf6rtU'long term'
pllint~~lIlti~:;tilie.They SQ~vtt~¢ tR~rliihai~d of ~rt~tet~p~tl11lli~te1~lii:ehY
separati'rtg'fue -iong~:ruriavoidid ,ca:p~~iiy '~~st~ from ·the ~~oided e~~-rgy" ~osts, but do ,no~
extend this frarilework to the more'important: iss~~ ~f di~patchability. Doucet, in a 1994
Energy: Journal article"tltl<id"jfCoordinah6n ~f N·on-utility Generation through ~iority
Contracts", ad~sse-s fh~ 'issue ~fdispatchability thro~ghasiiuctu~ed series of ene~gy
prices and_ e~~rg;y .J~eliver~es pre~ented, in,a ,de,termin,istic fram~work. P'9~~et's price
s~~ttlte Pto~ides: price' sign~als to-NtiGs th~tPtltsome vitlue on dtspatchabili~, but the
deterministicframework falls short ofdistinguishing between aVoickd'capacity and energy
cQsts. Thu.St limits are plac-ed,::on i~s-abi1ity to' integrate Nub iesou~~es effi~iently. The
fo:UQwing~~ysis sh~~sthat a much:larger potential for savmgs exists,through,adopting a
dYl)an1k~ri~ stru~tnre th~t simultaneously· ~ddress both the direct sa~ings fro~
~ ~ f A
dispatchability as well as the indirect effects on the cost ofcapital for the purchasing utility.
"Sin6e 'its ~asce~t stages 'b~fore' 'l:9~O-, the compe'~iti~~ po:We; '~ark~t 'has mat~red
significantly, pt~s~~ting a wh61e"host: of new 'pr~biems as th~ Nua b~comes a ~aJor
souid;:"~f n~~ ~~p~itY f~~' m~y utiiiti~~>' nn~ ~icl~' e~~~e~ f~u~;~ner~lfo~ of
1Moulton (1993) and Abbot (1992). ,
2According.tp ~e NoI1h A:nlerica,n R~liability, Council, the New YorkPow:et:.,J>ooJ had'S17 MW ofNUG
capacity in 1900,a~d j§ predictedtohave 5,417 MWof NUG capacity by 1;he d~ad¢s' close. For the United
States, 18,156 MW ofcapacity existed in 1990 with 35,352 M\V predicted for theyear 2000.2
., '; ~> '~" >, " ~"
sys~~~:'!~~~~~~~ITe:r~:~:tt::.;l::r~!t!~::~~~:;;··
wen as shift the con$tfuction and operating ris~ of new power plant eOfisttuction aw-ay
, ~ ~'~~, '. ~ ,v ~ ~, ~~~ ~ ~ , ~"~. • ~
3) Dispatchable ,Eijergy Contt~cls, 4) A~tual Cycte, Di~pa,tcha,bleE~¢.r,gy CQntrap~~~ The
risb~dben~~~iate~.~~~~h·~~actfo~·.~.ex~~;;; ~.•.~.~~.
supplier, and the rate 'payer. 1.'P eluc~date ~e distinctiQ~~; 'betw~n"eac~ contr~~t fQ~, @d
::>v' ~ >~ :'::' ,v ~~:( ~< ~ > ~ .' ~ »~ > v : • > : A -: = : > >~=::>~: >:~ .: " v ~_~ > • ~ > , ".:-'~ (,: v~ > ': ,': ~ ~: : ~ ~ _ : < v, ~ >:
f~rther clarify the ecollomic conseque~cesof ea~h ~ontr~~t,..CUl ~alysi$ ,of bo~h ditect
: ~ ~v ~ -: >_~: v •__ ~ ~ ;':;~:: /~>v::- ~: " v : ~ ,.<.': ,>_:~ :': 'A >:: ~:::~ ::>~- :>_:~:' ~ " :. : > ,: :1: ~ ~ =:: > ._~" :' ~.> > ~ ~:;.~ > ~ <
incremental costs ,for ene~gy produ~tion, and indirect ,fi'Q:a~cla:1, cost&,,~e pe.~ft)]m~~~ f~r a
Nmtbea~t ~tmty,3~e ~~Y$iS~~S in~m~n~~· difrer~ri;~siti '~~i~~~~rgy ..
:. >:>'~~. " ~i~: ~> > >, _ :-":<~':: '>:' : /-:~ ,""," ':"/' V<':~::= ,; >~ _>"v y ,_~> ' A~ ':"" ~ ,",> ,~: ,\"" ~ ~~ " : < ~ -~ ':" ~'"A v"< y,' -~-:::
'p~o:ab~t1q~::c:dsts}U1d::d~$;'~Q.':in¢luq~,'qJ::,dt1iM:~9;':~P9~;'tl;pti:~' ~~~~~~"~~p~si~~,: ~~~~~~~"
" ,','." ::=:t "':;:;:~~:::]:>::'4' -::)::, ,;: . ;':" <".' ': :-:-:::,' :>;:>: :/"',:'::::>':: ':, :,,::: ',",", '<""', ::>,; ;'/:<:;: ;:;' :, :-::;,',' ," ,:-:<:;< ",,',: :?" "
':by :~~Jltd$~y:.::,
ftom'the ·utility.and tI:1e r~te pay(},t. Under les~ opt:im~ 'pr()visit;)~s,. P9we~ co~tracts for, n~n-
utility gell~r~()R(~;G)~:~~e ~Jve~f~<~:;~~;;t~~. ~~illCIU~;·· ·.... . ...
~:~_:~=:~;' , -'~/," i .~~
1) loss of sy~rem,control,
~" ,,::>":;; "~" ~ "., ,"~
-reduced bond fa~il1g,from assu-m~d lia~li-ties5, anp
.v ~,>:: ",. ~~ ~ ,,~~ ~,
~) ~~q~¥~4::PQ;clt~~~::ofU~~~~~~~C ~U~:'e~etiY~
3)
.4) "hi~~ef. ~l¢ctti~ tfltes, f~~ ,9tl,S~Qmets.
In m~y sit,ua~ons, there:g~latory process~as- ,forced uti~ities to contractwithNI1Gs ~der
eC~li~c$d nperatillg te~!ha~~e ~~nfailess~~nopfunalfo( the \\illi~~~~ ~ ....
,~'~.~v-: ~ ~~~. A ~~/' ~ ~ -- ~ ~: ~, ,'".:' ~ A~ A V ~ :v~ ~
electric co.stom-er.
The p6ten~ial economic ef,(te'ie~ciesofco~peti~~ve ,pow~rmarkets, such as reduced
, ~'_' ~ ~ _ ~ _~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ A _, ,_ ~ ~ ~
costs ~I1d lower operating.a,nd financial,risks lor"rate p~y~rSt are paradoxic:a11y being
~~ ~,."~,' ,v~, '~ /A<~~<.:::": _,_' y~>.'~ ~" ,: :"',: ~~;;~,,'.~:"vV ~:~. ':~ '~:-.- ~A' :"< " ~~ v'", :-, ~ ~~_ '~_', ~~~'
underm:medthtougb inefficient :P9wet.p~tehas~,:cQP,tracts. Issues such as'regulatory risks,
> >' :': ~. ,:: ~ _ '~ ~~, ~~" ~ v":: ~ -" _ /_,' ~ ~~ A~" ' ~ ~ ,. , ~ 'v v
3The analysis isrele:vent- f-or any utility'col)sidering capacity additions from thermal energy plants.
4The critical element is theoptimal dispatch ofNUGfacilities, and the addirii)nal'coStS asS6ciatoo with
having surplus c~pacity'are h()t,part oftheanalysis. '
5
11AssumedJiilbmties" refer'to capaeity,payrtients to NUGs whiCheffect!vely becume:ltabilitles as the
utility has an obligation tis make 'vaymentito NUGsindependently ofchanges inc:apacity and etltrgy
requirements. ' " ,-insurance:,:and:the:consequelices of'failing"projects :hav-e been"addressed" by: the 'use of
"regulatory' out",clause,s:and'contract.pre-,apptovUl;·force'majeure ,ariel'dronage'ptovlsianst
takeover ,pro~isions',,for::failing' ,pt~lects:: a:nd'pe:rformafice criteria: for"payni~hts. (, The":
challenge is to enhancetheeconotnlc efflcietlcy and operating'integrity'oftraditional'utility,:
power supply sy.srenis within''a"more competitive: pdwet'market.', The obje'ciiv:~'of the
propos:ed new form ofcontract is:-{t> increase benefits for nite,payed' from effici~t pOwer
conttaeting;:w:htle,'CtlhttoUiQg possible detrimental>erfetts t6 ,titltiiy sbareh61detS' Of 'the:
, ,.,>
ll.. :POWER CONTRACTING MEC'lIANI:SMS
> "
1. FLAT RA'TE PRODUCEAND PAY'COlVrRA'CTS
Flat Rate Hproduce and pay" contracts, often referred to as Flat Rate Iftake and pay"
~~ ~ .
contracts, ~ere the first form of Nud power purchase contracts and represent the
prepon.derate $h,ar~ of electri~ powerptJrc~a~e '~gfeeroents,with ,-Nuqs.7 The rather
sirnpH;stic economic structure ofthis type of,'contract pays 'pto~~cers6rt"a ¢1kWh basi~ for





p* price of energy for hour i with the tI*" indicating a price adjusted
periodically ,accQ~dingto either'PT:Y-determincd'cscalatprs or an index of
escalation ' , ::-- ' " ' '','
ei : ene.-gykWh ;d~~iyere(}'for i hours
N : nun'iberofhQurs -i~ bilJlng ~riod (e.g. month)
E : elec£ric'sales'billlO'utilityfotbtlling period
6.Boling (1992).
7Ahbot (1992). Otherpowerpurchase arrangements may claim larger capacity and energy sales.4
'.,. r~~ ~@~~Qn;U(( ~nef:~<;i~nqY"Qt"Fla~Rateu>cqI;l~@ts c~·~.~tt~buted.primari~y to its>;'
fai-1u~ t9'~CQ~~ .f9~ .t~~ .~p~c~ij(;. ~~,.~yn~c o~!"a~g ~~d:~onQ~~·~nYJromnent.of.th~ ,.
~ _ ~ > ,','< ~ ~ _ > > ~ > ~>. > > > ~ •N(' _
utility- ~n.~t~ectt> ihe.Jt~oni9us l)~c~ure: 9f E;OlJ~n~o~~;gt)st n¥Qipliz:att~1:l >bas~~· on-each,.'
- ~~ ~. ~ -~~ - ~ ',~" - < > - > ~ > , < > ,
planr~ ,~i~al ~9~t of proq~~~onbec~mt?s dist9rtec;l~.:-1)~.NlJG o~@tor ~ill maximize
pfq~~S :~p4~~ tb~ ,~at :r:~~e ~~:l\Y~~ :PU~9l:t~e prj~e. s:~c:turt;·by ·pro~~~ing el~~ttieity whenever
possi1?l~~. in4epend~n~> p£Jts :o~rati;ng >c:Q~ts relatiy:~ tQ .~~~ Qf:the ·uti~i~y :;system.,',·This
_ v > , ~ -v v~ ~v~. _" " < ~ , ~ >, > - > ~ • A ~
indjffer:~Jiqeto .$tt:time ~f4ay ~r Seas'Oll; c$<r~~lt inle,ss thC$gp.~maI ;r~$oUtt;e'aUocattoB
~ > ~> _ > >~'.> ~> ", v > '~v > > 0 , > A > > ,,'. > • <-, ,
w~~~i~vet.. the :'utility". 'h~s .'r:esouf:~~~~'" )Vith"a· Jo.-w~r 'm~tg¥l;l:a:l '·.P(l~t;, ;Q:f, ,::pr~),~u¢;~t:~n.. ,.',
> ¢p~~¢:qu~~11Y;t.:Rat :R~~e:l~~O:~¢t :¢oI1~actS·.~M resulrin hlgb0r:~net'gy' :prdducttQD c&~ts: '~d
• > ' - ~ ~,., , , ~' • > ~ , ,
.~~p~Gity: c.(;lS~~. tli~;~:wOtfld.pe :ine~r:red if ·tti~¢.effiolen(col):tt~qlmechaiji~Ins~ used.
F~tth~rm~e,tfies~ Ctll1ttacts re~sbht~ marketri~ to~~elt~entth~iht~' than
competitive market prices cause the utility to· lose eustomers~ sa1es~ and-earnings. In
particular) contracts developed w~th energy purchase rates fixed to a forec~steq,rate of
, ~ , >.~>_: '~~;~' > > >, ,>' /, >" ,,:" >'" , > ~.~ :. • ~ ",' < ': ~ ~ , ',~' , >, : ' ~, - , :
escalation present the riskofdivergingfrom c()mpe~.tive marketprices over the lifeofthe
-. A = , ~
contract.
i.
On-Pea¥O:ff~Peakenergy .priqing is 'a slightly more complex form ofthe flat rate
contract. The.utfJity .provides a 'hi~gber ¢lkWh power purchase rate for energy delivered
dUd~g on-~i&:bQlitr$as'oppose:dto enet~y deUvered' duri~g o.ff~peak··bours. Anexample
ofthis type ofcontract can bewritten:
. , , >"1: ·<6 J 19 } , 24 -
L!.
"'Ilt 1:L·14- It,.·, E == b P e·· + a P e·· + - b P e·· IJ . Y . -. ',_ I}
j=l i=l )~1 i~7.. j~L' ~~29
where,
J : numberofdays in the billing period (e.g. 30 days)
1 : hours ofthe day
a* : on-peak. adjustment ofpower price p*
b* : off ...peak adjustmentofpower price p*Thedifference in on-peak versus off-peak ener~y rates are commonly developed to reflec.t
the average variable energy ~ost spread betwet:Q on-peak,an~ off:peak ,hour~,and~for
~ , >" ,.~~ ; > , ~ >" > ,. • > ' ~', A • > > > ~ ~
example, may be developed from a utility's retail Qn-peakloff~~aIfciles 'or margi~at energy
~.> '~~'~ : ' ~
and capacity costs. The *implies that the price and~the differentials:ate',predeterm.iiled.
The on-peak versus off-peak rate canpotentially provide an incentive for the NUG to
, /~ ~
produce energy'in accordance with the purchasing utility's needs. However, the economic
cdteri:on for,teal~time electricpower dispatching is continuous cost minimizing w~chcan
> , ~ ~ > ~ -
not~be->'a~Qurate~y':r~p~esente:(lby -only' tW() 'dif~etent 'ave~~~e})~cbase, riiies:;8 ,:~e, l~ss'in
efflet~ihz'y is':a flJi)~tiort: of-the, vari~~' irtth¢ ~tu~/dj;sp~tchco~t$.-" fu:-adtIiti~,~!cap:acit:y'
~ ~ ~~ >~ >~/ i > ~
,paym~'ots: :ate:'~ten included ~n a ¢lkWh, f~r:~tyfprenergy 4~livered, so that the combined
~ ~. ON ~,' >~» ,,' ~ v: : ~ 'v:~ ~ > ~
cap:acity and'en~rgy rate 'e¥fe~iiv~IY b~comes' one energy rate.9 'This coin-bined rate is
- i - ~ _<
>-
invariably greater than the NUG's variable cost ofproduction,off-peak. as well as on-pe~l(.
Thus, in practice, the c-ontract resembles a flat rate "produce an~ pay" cont~act with the
• , > > > y v >: _ A~ , "~, A > > (. ( : v
- -
NUG-trying to maximize energy production. The following ~a1y:sis will refer to and treat
FlatRate and On-PeakJOf~-Peakcontracts jointl~ as non-(~isp~tchable because,a ~at,Rate
con~t ,can,be ~o~kidered:'as:a- spe~ia:{~:ase of-an ()n..Pea00ff~Pe~-co~:tract (~~~b*).'
,. > "", "> ., > ••
3. BASIC DlSBA~TClJABLE 'ENlf;RGY CONTRACTS
A :Basi~ Dispatchable energy contract with ~ NUG can provide the ~ame degree of
~conottrlc'efficle~ncy,~nd opetation~:c~ntroft9the utility as, one ofits own plants. Th~~e
contracts closely resemble the e~onomic structure of utility-owned g~neration with a
capacity and energy componentofthe following form,
8Joskow'{19S3).
9A more stjphisfi6atetffu11ll'ofon-peakloff.:peak priclfig 15Doocetfs priority,priciQg s~~ure anq t¥aI time _
pricing which canprovide ~onsistenteconomic incentiv~thClt.capture the vadabi~ity in daifyenergy
producdon 'dosts.: ::Howevei~ >the~tOieCastihg 'energy ProUuction:rates seri'Ou~lyimpwrs',tbe ability to
accurately capture the variabIity in energy production., .
The dispatthable ene~gyprice will always be equal to or"greater than the'average variable
c~p~i:tY' h~illianl{t6'p~Oduce '6n~tgy'JorhOUr'i'
.t:;.ap~~W:¢f~;~i"r¢l-lf~¥\ ':. "






energy dIspatch offered::~s; welias~' ~C~6tlrit fo; the dtterior~Hon of-plant effici~ncy ,11
, , .
By integrating the 'NUG resource with the existing utility system, a Basic
~: ~ > "
~ - ~ ~
cost ofenergy production in order to in:sure against economic loss~ over the full range of
The'first term o,n the right hand side of ~e equation represents the ,fuel cost for
lt1the <4lpacity,component should reflectthe fix'~ costs offurnishing pow~r ahd,inc:lude,taX~J capitfll
payment, operations,and main~nancel ,and depr:et~ti:on,~ /yr,,~ tes;~d~'>~ ~,apacity comjXlnent main~s a
ci'inS:tatlt'Value,ll~er:$e,d~l1ti~n,pf.the biUin:g:piIj~;, ;:PQmon:s:'~f~~;~~~~tY-, cQm~~J ~ ~upj~t to
pe~odk eb~gej.'sut,b as O&M:costs, and are escalatedwith an approPriate j;i:id¢x~
llThecapacity comPonentfor theNUn is basedon an 3v,aUabiIliy basis. t'lUs can effectively bedone by
eitherp~y-ingtile NUG-o:n a ¢fkW basisfor available cap~city (whether ornotJheenergy isdispa~hed)or
through a $/kW-month capacity compotlentadjustedforavailability. Furthdtnitigation agMrIst '~suming
risk fo~ 9@~~i_tY;:f~~Y!:l'l~~~ ,~~ b~ a8N~~ tfu'Q9s:b ,~~ut-tP--ff,()f c~pacity ,paYf!l~~ .fQJ: plan~~ fallihg;~l()w a"
certain millitrluljl' }~Y:~n;{~va~.~~aity: »',: -: ': , .," :' ,,' ',', ' "": ' "':',' "
12Tramraction' ~Q:s~ fQr"a~spat~h~bmty are neglig~bJe. pisPfUc}l{nslructions Q~ be:delive~_¢lecttowCally
orby telephone. '
~ • > ./
Di$.pa~dh~~le:,eA~igY; c~ntf~~(~QYide~~igri1:fic~t,proqu.cti~n6~$t,~aviRg~;qvera;flat rate
contraet;~s ~A·.~~si~hifi~an;~perati~~al~"~tages.12 ~~e~e~~~~tptit~\<elsare
adJusted,based on th~ plant~s variable '~o~tof' pr(jd\l~tion;.:_ :::~ote:over-;- wheij,t1le:fac*hty~s
ou:ipnt is less than' 'ful~lo,ad, the 'ilti:~e~ capacity can be,included,in the 'utllitYl-s iletlye 1'0
, ..
~ i >.
,nUtIuty'sp:4'tnitig :(~serve.. In "a.d:d:ition~coor:d!na,:ted pl~nt~~t~nance ,with' ~be-util:ity, can
alsor~ceel1er~ ~ts ~~ r~llired capacity ~serV~ ~ar;ns. ... ..<> ....•
~IectQ.c '~tiergy produced and ib~ second termrepresents the capacity paymentfor'available
capadtY.16 .·1'he yari~~leenergy casUs rae prod~ o.fth~net plantheat~le(h) IlIldtlIe
::~:ttt~~~iz;=i:t~:=::::o>: .•• ,.~> ••. ,~,s,~:~t;~~:t!~~~f.::,::1::
> ~ > ., ", ~'. «,'«< ~, > ,. ~ , , >
c6ns~iY-~ti:v~ ~~~~ to in$tl~e prQ~ta~le ()~~~~i4n' ~~l$~tist};:~~::pioj¢ct '~~~ce ctite:r~a,7,
, U,~e>,: Q.~, ~':~~9gl~ ,V'~~~, -'{Qr:;::~4~,:~'e~t; Ja.~~,.or ~ N:~~1:Q >pl~t :provides";l·".reasonable
mechani~ to integrate.aJherm~powerplant into a, util~1yls>;pow.er ~l:lpply tmx. However,.
~ > >."A ~~ - - ~ ~ - > ~ ~ > ~ ~ ~ - < "
this'mechanism falls short ofcapturing,the full economic value ofthe resource by fixing the
variable cost ofproduction to a :~i.n$l~ est:ima~~d ~v:'alQe. ,.~ ~~der toJ~tegr~te:thecosts ofa
NUGresource efficiently, the contract must provide ~,ec.Qn9mjc stnl;clure, that tre~ts the
~ > > > >~ ~ >
NUG on the same basis as ifit were owned by the utility. This is achieved in the next type
ofcontract. '.
,,:"A~tw:iJ:Qy.cle J.1;hergy ':~ricjng' {iCEPJ '1&,:an· effl'ci:e;~t: 'c(;}t:ltract stfucture.,Its;" f~tfu
refflain$,:~~s;e~tiiUty '.the,same ,as: :tbe= Basic·Dispatchahle> e:iief:~Y' contract'with=a c:~pacity'·






hea~inpQt .(MBtQ)f;¢:qt1;ir~d:to :produc~. ~i k~,9felec:tricity. The heat input
is detertnined from the actual plant-heat rate c~e.
The&~" cOQ,tract$ are r~fem:~d >to ~: ·~.~Pf~lal :c:y~l~.,.~nergy: ~ontra,cts!; :--be:cause Jhe- variable:
~ > - <
ener~ COtnPQn.~r;i~ is:-det~rn¥~~d fromJhe.pl~nfsa~tuaLheat tate:curve; _
Jb~. ;~9e;~gy: .pr~4MctipA :~(fj.?ienci~$ .~~~ltiQ'g .fr(}m',Jtte:,-_~~e .p{.tbe ACEP contract
metho4-'pr~~I¥~: 9,omp(..'t4~v:e ~~ectrlc-::rates-:a;nd majJlt:aln :m~mum operating·.fle:x:ibiJity.
Com~~~:ve .electric f'}t~~:~~:~mairtt~tl¥~ .tm--Q~gh·:(qlJy> ~ntem:~t~~g th.~. NUG~sOUfQl}:into '. -.
the utility's existing power supply mix using energy dispatch methods that are consistent8
witli'e~isting util~ty owne4 res6tlrc~s~ 13 Maximum:opetating'--fleXibility ls::aclUevetlthrough
contractprovisions that derenninetht'NUGls full operations aslfitwere a utility plant~
Ill. -FINAN:CIA'L I:MPLICA,TION8::FOR UTlLITIES'
1. "RlSKANlJ'ili}i'cOSTOF)jElit
Each form ofcontract for purchases from a NUO represents risks and liabil~d~~.tQ,
rate-p'\tyers, utilities and NUGs. Power purchases made by a utility may incur indirect
~~ ~' ~. \.,>~~<:> . ,v,> ~~»> >
¢o~Js: ,tln.:Q9~h re~uc~d bond- -rati;~s _,whi~b in tQrQ c,a:n-:~nd~~e ~:'U:HlitY·s',~€;)mpetitlYe
ad¥~lijge.Re~c¢ Il~pdtatj~~$soci'lled ~ith~UY Plir¢:hases .·~·a 1~'SU}t6l(he
,,> ,
~d~~~t):~~bility ,as:sopitl~e4' witll,~~p~~i~y: ;paym~t$lQ::NUG~;:~ ~ll as:;~ :pe:ssible':er~si6It:
0-£-a :Utility!,~ab-ility to:serveits ,?u:stomerscompet:itive~y with expen-sh:e, NlJG' :p:U-tchase~...
Bond ratings are adjusted -by allocating a portion ofthe c:ap-acity obligations" as, (t,Ita:b;Uity-: ;-
without a'corresponding entry as an offsetting asset. In addition to ind:irect costs, Nud
purchases can be viewed as an external insttU:tn~nt,:~~::adju$:t a utilitytg capital structure.
EX!~mb:l~tion:tlfthe: e(f~tof a;~~itioJlaIindirect liabi1iri~~ori ,:a tlt~i~~'Qveral~ f~ance 'cP~ts
~ > < > / ~ ~ ~~ >>> - > ~ ~ > ,
can'provide ~seful insight for devei~ping a m~re optimalc.apital-:ktrQcttire.
th~ basis of trfirranchrl flexibility II ,- which reflects'the"opetating flexibility of the'power
pu~cha:se 'coy~act.J4,:'ltigidities: i:mp6~~ :by-,a: cotl:ttact~s::stmcture: :W:~i~h- fai:l to·tnirtOf th~
economicloperating effio:iency>'of,traditionm 'U:ti1ity~owned :ge.ttetati6n:teducea'£ompany,ls
fin:at1cial:fleribtlity. The:p1'Opor-tion ofcontractedcapacity'payments-to-,betnade'to-'aNUG
that-is:=cnaractermd:as,:balanrie<S:heet"debt.=byetedit rating,fttms, i~'tontingent-;upon:'the:'
economic':stmctnte'ofthe:contract... For:-¢.x:ample~: uhder'Duff ~dP4el:ps~s ~alirative,utility' -,-
13Thisassertion is developed from an incremental variable cost ofproduction basis which is independentof
the issuesofcapacity surpluses ordeficiencies.
14Abbot (1992).'capacity (flat rate priciflg) has the follQwi:~g "vatuated1t16 disadvantages:
,,1. ~i~tle or:no ~~~p~~~hab~~y ,~otpat ~wer mU$t be,t?ket;t ~h~Jl~v:er av:ail5lble_~
_'v ~_>.,'<>.-:V.>" > > '~~ ~~> ~~ ~.> AA ~. ~. A ~>~ >~~~. » ~> .~> i~
2. Limi~¢il.or,1l9,abiHty t(), ~c~e:dul~ main~nance ,to confqfll) t9Joa~t9rcQmpany ..":,,' ,,~ schedul~(f::p,fant'outages. ' ,",:' :, ,', : ,.' , " ".. .' ,','.., " ,
,3,;, litck\)f:cohttoYdvet'the factiity shoUldfhtsel1et temrlnate me·'c6n~t.
4. ~Qwer costS- under the current'Public Service Commission ruling 'may be' ",'
higher :th~"a;ltetrl~tiv~~, " ,,' .
">"-_-:~~<=:;,>,>:::.. y=:::~::)::-,~:«: : ~ ~ ,',: :~.>.> .~~. ~ - >'~> > > > >,. -
$tari~~4::~' r~:6~,'(~~FYas.sesS'e:s a ut;ilj~t~:~,~ ,qU~~it~~~.risk (a.qt~r':tQ) ~tW~n ,0:%., :_ >',' I' /," : .,' -, ,,< A ~ '~~ •.,: ~ > ~ ~> >~- • A ~ ~:- > > ~ /> »' ~~< ~ >,,>,. > > >' v > v > ~> >.' Y • ~ < " ~ _ < ~
and loq% to ~e~ect t~~ m~~et,; ~pe~~t~1?-~ ~n;d, ~~~~l~~ry, 9;~~:S ,~at, tJ:1e u~l~ty bears. The
risk f~ctor ~s s~:t;tJe<?t19 a ,wid~ d~gn~e of ~~~b:H~~yo-f w~ch ,th~ 9,OJ;i(ra~:l.fo.IllJ., is a central
~ • ~ : i ~ : ~ ," A _ > A ~ ~ N , A ~ 'v A, ~ A > - < > ," > ' " v' ,. > > ' yv _v v -
componen~.,_rhe, rj,s~ :{~tt()! US~~ py _~~l',. qt1,t~tmiti~~ t~,¢ p~t~nt1~l, 4¢bt. equ~v-alent by
< _ > v ~ , < ~ ~ - -> ,A i- > > - > -- >
calculating tPe 9_et:pre~e;~t, yalue (N:PV) of wtu~ paY;J;Ilen~sfor ~~pacityJ!<t) adjusted_ ~y ,the
A > ~ ~ , ,';" ~ > v > > v / v" ~-:' > 0 <_ "" / _ v v
" risk faQ~Q~'(Qcl-cij~~op,~;te~at 1Q%as:,s4<?~p bYJhe fol1()wj~g ¢qt)~tjo~?,;, :
> • v v v , 0 >.:=>.: A>' >: v>' »>" ~ V'"••
P 1 d~scount factor (.90)
<It : :ariltu~ debt adjustment factor
Kt : annual capacity payment
,T. ,- ;: Q;~a&qn of,conl;rnct(s) _
_ > ii' < ~. ~ , ,
,/ ,"
Thes.e adjustments are said to t1enable more realistic financial' comparisons'between
cOIIlP{t~~~~,~~~,~g;.f,9.tQr~ .~~~~~f~~~;: tm9.~g:~".P9rc:n~~d-,>pq~~:r:_:~~~~~~, ~~p~j~,s: W:~~h
buil~,$eir,owng~~~rating p~~~s",nl} Quff& Phelps:~~ aslightly"diffe~ent ~ethodo~ggy~
15Abrams (1991).
lOA term used in credit rating industry. See Abrams (1991) orMoulton (1992).
17Moulton (1991).the two compani~s,
A utjlityt,s hand rating can be maintained ,by either re~tQrip;g;the effective coverage
ratio .thtcli(glf·if'llighet 'alf<>~~d' J"a{~ of re'tutn:"&f: ~tr6ri~ ·,·t~gtil~tJfy:·~s.ur~~c~s of Cost
recovei};:furthe:erttlre:contbwflt.fe::'tt'sh6uld also 'btfh()te~i~~~"p~~:~~,,~h~lp~: considers
'"' >'v> > ". > ~ ,'.~ > , >> - > >
that long..t((I1~l:~~~r~~~~H~ pUrP~~e~J)~s-e·~~~ ~~~)ype qffip~~~alJ!~~n~~y:, ~"purchases
, oVfv'.~.o.'>. > .>." ,»~.>' "~. > ~~ ,_,~. __ > > "~-"/ ~, > HI > »~, A A';~>
,FfQ:Ul the:-:utilitY~s, pe~SIWcti:ve" NU9·paynrents are"equi~~l¢nt:ta:,W~l.putGhasesJfroma
lOhg.·te~· ~tmti~(;t. ···T~~Iill~~I~·.~.lYPi¢atiy.ttiti··tIit&~~h.ii·it~;~~·~ajU$tnient
d~se ~!'s(j~ ot~ttj~OVetable·~~~\lS!l with .!h~f~iuwp'Wmenf~~li~:q~l'aiul1be
aSs~~~lisis(\t"iilheoffiltteCf ff~i~¢~~>~~t. ·Cteditt~d~~;;ge/lt~hi~~the
c~pac'itY portion 'o(NO(fplitcl1~~S as'undertak1fii ~h~taitefistlcfsiihii~r it) ~~'~qtiip~~nt '
leas'~" witha Joil~(t~rIn: 'oh1ig~tt6rt';t(j m~e paymentS to tne':NtiO fof del:i~~re~f capaci(y. ":
Becans~ :titiiitY"'atttiJndh~ :pria2tib6~· :d6:':h~t:feto~rk:e ;fu~' oblig~ficiris to ,irtaki=NU'G
paymen:ts: ~sociated'~lth' capaeity 'putcliase~~,thf :rating agencies perf6nn ·off~balartce sheet
adjusth)~~~s' to' utiHty:~~c~:'$~e.ei{"'Th~:iti1p~~cit·:l~ijljili~ ofNUQ 'ptti~h~~$::~~~~lt<;ftQm
the following perceived risks: 1) the reg~latQ~,d~kof contin~ingto allow fuel adjustment
cl~~§~,e~p~~singof N,~JGpayments" 2)the'market risk ,~f 'm~ntaining ~uff:ic~~tlt revenues
> ( • > - > ~ ~ <
to cover NU;G purchase obligations,' 3) maintaining the competitiveness of a utility's
eleCtric rates.
2. EVALUATION OFRISKFActORS FOR DIFFERENTFORMS'·OP ,CONTRACT
FLAT RATE; CONTRttCTS
'Plitt Rate:ci1ntfactS,;sUih>,as'the,:,Ne:w' 'Yorl~(;:S:tate's' :legislatively m~d:ated ¢OlkWh
contract; have'all toe- dis~dvaritag~s discussed-'itl the previous section" .<These-contracts,tail'
significantly short of mirroring utility built generation, and con~,eq~ently, h~ve highIt
qualitative f-iskfact()~-."S'o,thata,lar-ge:pro:pprtion ofthe,capacity payments are treated as
additions to balan~e ~h~t debt:by ra~~g,agencies.
ON-PEAKIOFF-PEAKPOWER PRICING
On-PeaklOff-Peak contracts7 reflecting retail on-peakJoff-peak rates or some other
two tiered,rate strocture;'effectively present the same financial riskS-arid potential liabilities
to the utility as'FlatRate-contracts'. :lh'omer:'to prevent unnecessary "dumpingtl'ofelectric
po~er" wneu th~' .4em~d> :to,! po:wer 'is >,-low, some contracts' c'ontMn provisions :ror
cf:.u~~~i:lifig N:LJ:Q put(;hases up 'to:':a,n estab~lsfl'ed >riumb~r "of hOllts 'p¢ryear;'1:&- This':may
preventthe utility'from hav:fn$ t()~ump'powet, ,~ut itstill d~s'riot su.c~d jncaptUring the
full;ecoflomic potential ofN:UG:powef.. Standard' &: Poors ttcognize correctly that, in
practice, On-PeaklOff-Peak power-pricing is equivalent to a Flat Ratepowerpricing.
BASIC DISPATCHABLE ENERGY CONTRACTS
The ~conomicand operational advantages ofBasic Dispatchable energy contracts
reduce'most of:fhe q~aij:tatJ'Ve :~pe(at~g disadvantages_ofFlat '~at~ contracts. This,form of
contract goes a long way to maintaining competitive electric rates by minimizing the
production cQ~t$ofenergy and redl;lcing a utility's qualitative,risk-Jactot. A reduced risk
factor win improve,a,utility1s<credit ra~ing ove;r Flat Rate corttracts:19
ACTUAL-'(:;YCLE EN)lRGY PRICING
The ACEP contract's efficiency in meeting electricity demand improves a utility's
> > > ~
bond rating over Basic Dispatchable energy contracts by additional reductions in the
~ ~ > i • > ~ A
prodnction costs ofenergy and reduced financial costs. Although the capacity payment
obligations (off-balance sheet liability) remain the same as under the other pricing forms,
the qualitative risk factor is lower, which reduces the impact ofthe contract on the utility's
18New York State curtailr;nent proceedingsCase 92-E..0814.
19Moulton (1991).12
off.:·b~'lflc:e sheet Iiabili~ies.20; Th~:.AeEP' contralZt:-pr(;):vides :t11e:best·'fotM"ofa·:coitfrac:t=for',."
keeping electric rates lowcompared to the other tht~-contracts:,forpritChased power~ ,
IV. FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL
Cr~dit· ag~~cie~ ~s~s,s,-the ri~~~ ~£" ~U(~ :PlJ:f.~~~~es, J~y, ,.~x~ro.i~~ng .a co~tfE,\E;i.t~S>;
- v v' v > ~ > ~ ~ " .~> ~. > ~ - , > > ~
fan~·.·~9-g~t~rF:Y~~.~9~g}h,~ .~~~~t l~tW,n~p~J~~::~~P~'~~ :~~~f.4~~::9fJb;~::NVQ. j.s ,1~~W~f:~g~~: '.
:::0::;:~S~a:::j;:~:~~ar:~:::::~::::::~W~::::::
-- C(~l~~~cti~l1; :,~y,,»~~s;i~,<:u~l~~i~~}~atn..a. ~e~ati~~lY-> S'¢~Ul;~ ~~~~;:~f .:re~~~~ ~ith: [at~$:::s-et·,
relatively low.})Y regu-l:a.tiQn. Ijowevert by t.h~ .&~~ d~.s~gnt,utili~i>~s.are 1i~~ed in their
~ " ~~~~ > > > • > ~
ability to assume risk through additional debt financing.
Thetargetcapital cost structure~'aclopted 'by most'utthtie-s,and,acceptedby"regul:ators
can be',characterized as' ~.~low .risk~· with:the .~quity;>component :commonly-approachi,n,g' the
propot:tiQn .~fd~bL '.The securitY'of reg,lJ;l~t>ed utility~tive~tn;lerit~.,gert~aliy .tes~ii>~J~wet'
intere~t ~11~~ fl'i£debt and equity for u;m;ies ~r~US~Gs. f1tbli 1sbowslUlexarttPle ~f··.
the comp~ative:c:~p-~t~.oosts f~r autiHty':and:aJW-G-.: 'The utilitr ~$-16\y¢t costs ofbotW, ,
debt anq equity compared;:to ,~he.NuG~ an4in additjorl.,.tat"utility',b.as, a<lb,wer:wefgnfed
cost o~ £-apit~;:hef91?e'taxes. }{()~rever,the same ~~Rit~tstro~.tufe~,.ori ~"·~te~t~~-:b~s
~ <" ~~. ' __ ~ ~ ~ " ',' ~ > > ',,"~ >.~ .,' ~>. A~ A __ ~ , v
;~ v>~ ~'~ ~~
NUG versus 8.41% for the utility. Th~ nearly one half ~~a ,~rcent ~ower inter:est rate f~r
"< ~ ~ > < > • ~
provide the opposite conclusion.22 The after-tax weighted CO&tofcapital is1 ~94:% fo~ ~e
/ • - ~ v ~> ~ ~
of NUG caPacity provid~s an advantage oVer"'utility -capacity in a competitive' power
~ ~ v • - > > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~v ~ >. > - ~ ~ >
20See Moulton (1993), Abrams (1991), or Abbot (1992),
21SeeMoulton (1993), Abrams (1991), orAbbot (1992),
22The after-tax interestrate for debt is calculatedas tne product ofone minus thetax rete- of4O% times the
intetestrate, and theequity rate remains unaffected by taxes.13
maik:eb' However;: jFshould ,be'tecogniz¢d",'t1iat 'the)NUG is abU;' to',>~bb1eve'" ahighly"
leveraged capital structure through the utility·s commitmenttopay for ¢nergy deHveries:23
T~b.~ 1: C.pital ~~s~ St~cture
• > • ~ A· _ :
Percent
~ ,.~. • > .-~ ~ > ••
Debt ", "$2%",
:§g\iity '12%
Electric r:a:te' ,payers hear the~,."cost of inefficient, long, term: pow'er purchase
arrangemen.ts. In'ordertounderstand,the:effects·orcontr-actson:tate'payers"tlt1der the''four
power,purchaS~contr-acts discussed'above fora'repre'5entative>ulflity (Utility A) incremental
energy costs are calculated and the financial costs are determined using two" alternative
.methQ4~:;::;:i)JijeJ:ncre~~d:cos,tofdtbt::(diS'c~ssed 'i~ :S'¢ct;ioil,:rm~ ~d.'~) c~paclo/ :p~ym~nts
as ca-pi~al J~as~': obligations.24 The,'results can be generalized,using .method I for any
utility, altho1,Jgh,the:size of-the indirect.~osts offinancing,wUf de,~nd on theimportance of
NUG purCQas-es. ' lhe·capital:lease:.approach should, only be,.considered if a ·utility ·is
perceived:..~s ~i~:h :tisk Where an 'increase>i,n, c:Qsts. or leverage::'pose :a problem to 'the'
company's finan~iaLviability. (Utility A, was selected::beeause'it has a -relatively large
amountofNUGpurchasedpower.) ~():~ analyses evaluate$etotal in~rementalcostswith
each contr~9t ~ t~e e~clu.~ive,means of pp'rch~ing_the ~;~9 e~p~~lty. Th~st< c,?sts..are
23In addition, debt may he retired mote qUickly q-y the~G than the'utility leadingtolow~total finiUite
charges. ', ' ., '. . . _ ..
24theresults are based on input~o'btalned from utility A's 1991 Integrated Resqurce pian (lRP) and /980-
J990 Financial andStatistical Review.14
dev~~9~ ~smg::q~ity;i\:~ ~x~$ting :~d>platm¢d,:~~:i~Y)~~~';~~~J;gy-;;:p:tl~~~es:from NQG,
> " ,"~, ~ ~ ~ ~ • ~ ~ , ~ i ~ A· ~ V > • - • ~ > ~ > , ~»
Both-financial an~lys.e:s snare.tlwsame incremental costs fur e.nergy pur~n~es which
are determined from an Ene~gy Piodti6tlon Cost;MOd~l: (E~CM). 26 The direct costs
determined bythe EPcM:ri.ieasure the incremental costs to rate payers'for inefficientenergy
disp~,~ct(Md,.'f;aJ;l; ,cons~q9~ntly be classified ~. :fu~fc~sts",~J: ,<,por "th~ >Debt 'an~ysis,the
iIidij'~t~n:an(;~\lioSt§~;tiet~liinin~a:ft»ma tiili~ai>ciist M\3det(FCM)2$U~~an •.
~.~~ ~
ri~~ :an~f finantl~,ii~b~i~ties.::rbe in~ir.ect costs,are 9lstin~t> ft~m~btit comp~~bl~ ~{) tll¢
v > > > .v, > v",' ',', ,> '.>'.' / v " • '> > > ~
" ,,;:; ~:>:::>:»>
Hi¢~mental ¢:ast of ,~q~i:Valen:t c~pacity Quilt by,'Utiltty':A >an~ ':tirtance~ at Its, weighted
averag~--cosi.of.capital..",The ~e incremental cost methodis'used ror:the leaseanatysi:s~: It
shoUld>:~:tem:~~lle'red:throug~out th(t:analysls::thatthe,physicatchara:ct€fistics ofthe'new
capa~#y<are :idenficali:n .a:ltc~es;, "l.t):::otber<w()-f:ds~ the:.investmenl:in.ca;pacity:is::the's~e,
but the co~t of:f~~ng,the·-inv¢stQlent :varies., :
-Th4J~~~;.;~ti~lys'1~ :4r,a~'s::'UPQ~:,:i~~>'.~UYllJ~~Q,W :'vets~~: I~~s~;' ,)tloq_el :~~ :d~t~t~pe
finan~~CQsts .•. The ~~Of aca~tal~aseutiiii!e& a utilitY's debt~apacity.~~UCing the
lessee's >:~hi:lity. t~ is:su~, mQte:::~b~:in>,the future~: Lease 'ohUg~t~onkc~ur consequently be
vie~ed ~:equiv'al~nt.to capa~ity additjQos 'financed;~ntirely ~#h debL The c6mp~attve
'capa~ity·:;ad~~do~$ .ide Vti~ity ,A:ate'fU1:an~ed :at,{he',a1ter:i~, c:ost {j:f debt :inste:ao:,:Qf·-me·,
weig~t~d av~agecost ofcapital:with:an ~j:ustment for tht:inffirect:::f1l1ance:~c~sts;,
25Th~:~~~:ht-otmJOcap~~ir; :~Jidel~~i~eti~i~ d~nve~;to:~euti1i~-\v~kelli'ilie s~e-iJ ~ffbU;- ,
~enarios@u~ Qas,ed on the va!)le'sJisted in Utility A
fs 199:l :JRP. Annual e:nergy purchases from NUGs
t>.eyon(nhtf:YW'Z-002-'were--ass~m~'uiesealateat a-constlmt'r~ nf 1.2%.
16~ l'~hnicaI ,Ap~ndixfQr d~Scftption.
27Costs associated with surplus capacity resulting from mandated p.urchases werenot calculated for Utility
A. and costsofadditional reserve requiiements wihen NUGs fail to foUo-w estabtrshed,utilit)l-practices,for
coordinateQ maiijwn~q~ ~~e99:l~~g: w~~¢J~l~~,Qm~t~d. :th~j~~~ijcf:l~~~f9T $tr,acthlg.,(to~ tbe~~.~
problems'ls ;th~t ..~ 6bj~ctive:6f the paper'is'to fotUs on>tbttgeheral unpllca-iicins'ofdifferentfoni1s'of
contract~and not ~o describe the i~i~syncrasies ofa specific regul,at91'Y envi~W'lnient.
28See Te2hnlcal Ap~ndix fotdetails. '., : ' ., > ,1. 'ENER:G¥ PRqDlJCTION 'COS~rM(1)EL- - >
The direct cost calculated by the EPCM ~s:~ssthe additional,cost for NUG energy
~ -' ,'_ : __ ~ : ~ r', _ A r > ": ~ >: :: :>:' ~~, ~/' ~> ~ :: A ~> "': : > > "~~ ~~A ~ = _ > > > ," A A : >';;
purchases over operating and pricing the same energy resources efficiently. The ~PCM
... < ~;> i>~~ f' : v~'>~ ~ > ~v = ~ <»~ ~,v
determines the incremental energy costofpurchased ~nergyversus energy_deijveries based
~ > ~. ~ v '~~ A ; ,
on the most efficient d_ispatch ~echanism for the ~ew g>en~ratiIl;g resource (Le. utility
:' •• > ~ - ~::.:. • ~ .: '. _v ~<> : >:' : .~> ~> / ~ _ v." A > ~ ~ ·v ~
generation). Since it is as~umed that utility owne,d ge.neration and the ACEP contract
i ~ ~ _ ~ v • J> "_ ~ ~ ~ ~ _: , ~ ~ >> ~ ~. ~ ~ > v"
~~>~~ >~. '.v.~~ _
mechanism are operated and priced efficiently~ there are n<;> incremental energy costs.
T&seeffi~ieRtfo$sofe~~rgydi~lItch ~becOO!par~d~th~l~sse1fici~ntB~i~
Dm~~ttfhable~dthe twO~oiH1iS~tC~ll~contr;lCt§. ... ••. .. •.. .. .. .•.... .. ...••.... •.. ..
week into-'siX:c~;>:mpf)rients:cdnsisting of four partltiorts fOf weekday hours and two
partitions fOJ; weekeQd ,bp:9r~,.29 I,n adWtiop. to calculating the direcl energy production cost
dif£erentials~the;E~CM:accounts f:~r other ene~;g~)mducti:oncosts .sllch>,as _t~n '-minute
spinning reserve. An;energy production simulation determines the hourly production cost
differential bet~e~ ~~:contract pr~ce- Yer~us effic\ently~ -Q~ra,t~~ generati9u.-The hourly
, ,-
etiergycostdifferentials ~~ consolidatedinto the six time partltions. The 'differentiat~for
each ti$~ -p~th)n ~~ as.su_med to,escalate,at a 5%, peryear nominal rate to reflect the
cha:rac~risti~s-bfa typical contracL
Tal':~~ 2 _~i~p~~ys t~~ in~remenlal energy costs fo! __a 1 ~ pti:rFh~s_e ,o~ ~pn-
dispatc.b~\Jle N:QO e,nerg!;. ov~r ,a typical we~l-cJn 1990. The Itdelta
U values in$lMWh
repres~lltthe aver~ge estirn~tted' iJl!;renJept~ co~t ofNUG cn~~gy pux~h~~$>,a~Ye Utili~y
A's syste-ffi,,}ambda..30 The:Hduration facto(,represents the percent ofoperating time th~
delta _~~~~:e"al?plies,. _:F<;>r 't~~ qff-p'~ak,,~Q~rs qf 11 PM'to? AM:t::,Flanid:on ':D) not;l"'" ,
dispatchable energy contracts cost rate payers an additional $51MWh for 80% of the
291n order to simplify the analysis, the Flat Rate and On-PeaklOff-Peak: contracts, as discussed above, are
assumed to be operationally the same, and accordingly, were consolidated into a single contract fonn (non-
dispatchable).
30System lambda refers to theincremental variable production cost for a utility.weekday hours ofthe y~ar.Ovetthe same tim:~,P~tiQ.d;::Jp-sllen(nui1ute:.spinrong.:re$ety~s . '
cost:$O.23/MWh, calculated as the product of per~entofcapacity ,~socia~d with ~Phn¥ng
res~tv~~'tiirie~ ih~1oa~:f'8hriiticiri fact9;:;~;n:,r~>$1.1niWH ~piri~ng':~~erve ~'al~~. 'The ,c~sts
for 'each' $IP~ti~:ti :are' ii~gai~: for tEeweek 'and then:~ 'Y~ar.
'Table 3' displays the' increrri~rit~'i energy production costs for 'nQ.t1-dispatchabI~
> i, < ••• v ,
contra~t,~ for the years 1995~' 2000: ,and'2005. Addition~l details Of incremental energy
oasis ~~:':tor 's:h~wh \u" App~~~ix.A.: 'As 0ne ~ould expect,' ~edispatchable '~n~~gr
CQnfracts"have:np/cost ,f()f.'1:f{ininute, spi~ningJ~$e11'e~ b~t. th~,:BasjC",pi>$~tchable"c~~~~~t'" "
has~sni~HlldJ~~f~ ~riergy c~st~Wittlthe me~(1iesof4~~; al~~~e~~
, < ,
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2. THE FINANCIAL COSTMODEL
The Financial Cost Model(FCMt,used for the'debtanalysis, calculates the indirect
costs a8s66i~~td > With":N~G-purch~~es' wh~ch are'detemuned, from" the incr~as~~;::C6~t of
issuing ne~,debt. Becau~¢ the capacit¥.,additions are supplied by NUGs, these n~w'debt
issuances are for other investments such as transmission line upgrades, construction of
new 'tr~smissi()n ::facHities, or:'ins:iaIiituon:of en1is:siorts <corttr~l equipment on':exlsting
plants;' These 'In:drrecrfirtahci~ cdsi~ can"~ ~(}mp~ed\6"the 'coSt:6fhtiiJding the' ~ame
resbUTceM~~~~~fQfi~~~~"twithlliliwt1~nted a~~g",~ 6flilipiW($h~~ in
Tabl~ll~;':-ttie:-,ili~etc6sts 'at:~:in~ded :to adjtlst':thel~~ifu~~ :~heet::6fitiiliiiY A, irt~~i'if
appropijkte-:to-:use:the weighte_~~V~r~ii~i oi:capiful. ",:,
theFcM' e:stiinaies U'dlity A~s long term debt issu:ance'{as $330 million lor 19-91
through 1993 and thereaftere:sc'alating at a constant nomfnai rate of3% ann:ually':through
2005': A' rridd~rate esriiiIatioIl tate15: u~ed 'to r6flect"sl:6wer'lon-gterm ttgi~na1 :~c6ridmic
growth, -improved'efficienCies in el~ciric equipment, and a greater dependence'on NUa
purc~a~e~i- {)9Wer. The: :m~tutity oflong' term deb~:f~'suances are, set 'according'to the
dutatlon and proPortion::'~f'p~t> issuai:te~~. The off..ba1arlc~ sheet obligations and quMitative
risk-:factors are detertnined accordIng'to'the established,eriteria ofd"edit ratingcompanies'
and'::a;re: used:' a$:' :a 'basis'<',:fol' '~>adJlJsting :-interest tates''for debi.~1' 'Both 'bond rating
downgrat:ies and d~nie:d' up:grad~s a$ 'a res-tilt <of'NUG'p'urehases ate 'assessed in the
~, ~ ., . >" ~
Fin'ahCiilr'tJost'M(}del '(FeM). ,. However',' the rating:-"adjustme:n:is are 'sptcified
coriierVativelyJorlatge slUfts in>'ott~balanc~ sheet obligations,
,'- 'Th6'-'biher:'cases'eValuafedby-tbe'PCM ate the 'Basi~:Dlsp:atcbable contract and' the~
ACEP c6ntratt'riiech~lsm~ In'eadl-CMe, the asse:s-sed co~trae{thecharttSttl isthe exclu~ive
means'~f t~rttr~cting -frir'NUb p6~er under Utility It's prbjected'procurement of'Nun
capacity mid'energy. Tabie 4-'specifies 'the' 'basis point premium's- used to detennine'the
indirect fmancial costs ofNUG purchases.
31Moulton (1991).18:
, "
Table :4: Ba$is Point Pre~iums 'by Con-tract Type
,Vt.iUt!. mterest premiums
> >~. ,<: ~ , / ,~ ,:: > ~ ,v '>~>~ ,>v »,> ·~>v ,'.«', < ;.v~ ~>~ > v. '~> ::~ v,>~>; < ~> "
,Ye.gr > / >, ,1291-J294" 1995..1997 1995~,OO2 .2003;-.:2005
Flcit 'Rate:illid<On~PeaIdbff-Peak' '.- '~5' .-: :,' ",' '. ";-"Sir-' , . ',,' 75" ." , 50'
B~ip:Dispatch~~le . 13 25 33. 13
ACEP '',, ',. :,::" lO '20 > 25' " "10
. ~re~# r~tilU~S. fOf".t1at, R~~e ~d. op..;:e~:~:WP;ff-Pe~~ '?ql;lt~a~~s, t9~low S&P:'$,
•• ,> ~ > .'__ • ,'v.' ',', > ~>.". > ~',. : :: > ,. < v> A ~ > .}. > > ~. ~ V,',' ,. ~ ••-~," >~ > •• > > > > _ > >,> > < v v v
pr.o,ced~~~ .whi~~: a~ttiln~~e·pO% Qt :tb~._~Q,~a1 ,p~<?j~t~d p~y:m~nt~;~· ~~p~~i~¥"rel~ted·~' A ,25
••, v :-~. ' : ,v > •• >~: > ,.'/ ';'v v,> : ',> >. > ~ ~:;> > '_. : > A • :-v<': > > _-_ >~,v v ~»' > v'", v > .>. > > ,'.', 0 < ~>~> >,' > ~ - > Vv ' ~ ~ N v> L
the ~ornpapy m~y,be (Qrc,~~.to ~~glP, PQ~~~. 32, ~t ,i~a$s,~:J1le.d th.at Utility,Awill sl!fyive th~
> ~~ c~_:: > _ : .,',' ~ ~ , > ~_> A ' ~A > ~'~ ~ < ~ • v ~ ~. > v· . ~ v ~ - A ~ > v ~ > _ ". " > ~-
lat~~Jnf-~si9n :P~:}~:GPJ!Qwe~; O:'Y~fJhe ,n~~~e:1~.~~9~; W!;~9ut;AAY, ~~8.~fj9~t, ~~B~&: '9~ th~"",
: < ~ >" ~ > ~>~ '" / ',> ~ v ~ > A.; ~ ~ > > >
comp~n.Y ~,s oy~rall .A~~gi~l'S:Qp<?ess. CQnse:q¥l~J1tly~, t~e:fin;an~ial ~atin:g, ip:~titlltion·s;wUl
~ > < > ,v,' > >. ~vv;, ~ v< >' < ~ , A V _ V >~ > -' "A ~ : >Y, ,-. > •
bec9:we,~9,~ p~mfQtiabl~ witl},Jl,(i,lity ,4~~ ;.pr9V~:fi,:~~~~.~~' .3114' f;~4uq~:the' :q~,~it~~y~ :ri~k
~;~~~~ ofdff'~l~~~~~tlia~mti~S; i~r9Vill~~~~~~;S¢~editr~thtgby25.
basis :P9in~s, in ~9Q3. ,Althol,1gh t~~ ,p~~portio~ Qf J~H):9 c.~p~d~ ~il1,~ntinu~.t9 inqease.
',' v _ > " /.' '" >,' (~ ,'-, • _ > ' " _. ~ v • _ > - ,.>'~, ,v,,.' v I" > ., ~ A • - > ~
from',the y.ear~,:4~:Q~:Jp.ZOO~~ t4e,.~q~p~rj~;,a~~9~p~~~:~9 'man4~~ :~~~~~ ~~~:,:~~tli;sitiPl!S:, .
eff~tively an(ta4J~s,t its b~at)~~ ~~;t(tPre:ve~~ ~Qdi~:ion,:al,~r~dit$ratings. , " __
...••U~tbeB~DiS~4'~~~l~~· Ai;;EIf~Q~.~,ti~~;A:;freditP~9n for
planned NUG purchases foll~w ~~,'~am~ pat~~rn, ~~ $~, ~9n-Qi~p~ehal?J~,.~onft~~t$ :~~[,the
< ~ > ~ > >' ~ < - " ~ ~ > l ~~ > A ~ ~. > ~ _ v ' - > > ~ A
s~~ :f~~~ll:S~ :t~~: s:ig~~~~~~t #~~r~~£e i~'~~is, PQ~~t:~:~~,'e~lJ,t~ ~9~~,~~~t~A~b~~. ~d
th~ dispat9hable ~a$~& CaI;l,.he, ~tkiQu~~l,to ~ r:e~tiC~~,. q:U,alitativ¢ r:i$k, p~ftipj~nt~, ,A~ .'
:.: >'~ .<;~ ,. > _ ~ _"A ,.'< ~}> ~:: _: ~.::-:: ~ >~: : '»~~ <> :- },_ > ~ > ~ .;~ > > .>~ ~v f v _ >~ •• ~ > > > " > > ,•• _ " ~ _V·,, ~ ~ >: v: >;>"V'· i_ > ~»~~ ~" ~ ~>A /, v> , v~~. > -
additio9~~. c~mpqp,:~[lt" ~fJ,he FCM, i~: t~~s~es:s, the Q1ibe~ nn~c~,,'~9§t':qf~~llty b~ilt.
, ~ v > V ',' ~ _ >., v> ':~, • - > _ > • > ~ ,:v~ , >,.~ ~ > ~ >., ~» > »> > ~> > >~ > > (' ~.
gen,etat~()R" v~rs~s NPO, g~~er~#~~. ,,!9 ~~~>~t$ge t~~ ~?d~~i9~~'·co~~,Qf .\ltiH~y b\liJt,
32Higherenergy costs associated with dump power in the late 1990's for non,.dispatchablecontracts were
assumed to be partially mitigated by an external system sale.1'9,"
generatiQn~' a,47:baslsl:iomt'finance '¢eIilium'(fr6:iri'rablt lili'ii~se:s$e(f6rf,the -estim:~ted
average capitaJ, expendItures,for new capac~ty a~quisitions. Thiscostis comparedwith the
finanCe ~~~~ associa~~ith NUGP~tcWes for selectedy~ars iIITabkS:.
~- ~ ~ ~>~~.
Flat Rate and On..Peak/Off...Peak



















B. 'liUYI!!:(l!mOYi! <VEils'uS IJ£A:SE MODEL
> ~ ~.::.~. :~~~ »'~>;:-: >, > > >. > ~ A
> :, ::T#~:tise' bf:the;~:~buythottdW:' vetsu~:lease~;"modet'inthe leas~ 'an'aiysi~{com~pohd~,'to a:
high"risK sittiation whe¥e:additional'leve:rage:or intre~s:e' in costs poses aproblem to the
, ,
fmancial viability ofthe utility. Undera capital lease, the present value '6fthe:future iease
liability appears as debt with the corresponding asset value also written into the books.33
ThUS., the capacity purchase obli~ati()nsfortJtillty 'A:become equiValent to ad~bt'liabi1ity.
With th~'e:ntite"c~p~city,Ob;ljg~~on,>tr6at~~:;as debt, t~er~ ~<~o i~dl~~cf.~n~ce co~ts for
Utility A. However, the treatment oflncrementalcapacity additions as debt requires Utility
Al6rise: its,:~~{t~ ~~st of,debt-in 'co~pari~g the finance 'costotutilitY 0w~ed generation
vers~s'NUG purch~es.34 The 4_18 'p~cent di~ference betwe~n the NUG ~fte.rtax cost,of
C'i'lpttal (i9:4fJYand the :'~tiiiiy':aftbl{t~ 60st :~f debt-(5.?6%')' tldds'a '~tgnificant'finance
preiniu~'to"NOG :c~p~ity, ~dditi~ns:35 'Finailce costs for the lease '~'aiysisare: ~hown for
sele~ted y~ars: in'Table 6.:
33A '~apitai l~~ ;eq~U:~~ 'ili~ ~~e~t' v~ue o{the'lease li~bili~y to ap~aroncompany balance sheets'while
an operatinglease acts as off-balance sheet finahcing.
34Bierman (1986). The weighted ,average costofcapital ora risk adjusted ratecan be used ifadjustments
are made for the fact thatthe decision involves asset financing. ,
35The'ironiinat 'valueS' of the NHG and"utility ct)s(bfcapitaf change lht'ougl{iime;bitt the'increntental




:2000, ' 200$, , ,; ,,.$1MWlf $iMWH' .. '
.<:.4.:5:2, ::" -:' .,: ,:",:, ::<:':':5~9S:
4.52 5~08
,~.$2 ., 5:~~8
::O~9Q, ". :.', ;::, 0;00:-: "
: Th~.:1:e~~>.t;:::ana;lysis.:p:f<;rvl4ies a diI'~:t:,:~n~. conservative bas:is for e:y~ua~!ng '~~~
~ l>~ ~ • _ i > > ~ ~ ~ ~ <' > > i > N • > ,-, > - -, ~ • - ~, - ~ • - , - , ·v~ • > , ~ >' ~ , >
purcha:s'es ;vefsus utility 'bn~t generatio~.·,~d avoids =the uncert~inty a$·s.Qqi4t~~:::wjib,. :;"
~ > ~ / ~< A
de~e~mi~1:~g:::t4~,,:q;~~lita:~hf:e',4ise9~ot ,'f:at~Qi:' 'US~4 .:in:. ,~e :~~t" ~:~~Y$:l$~:";4J~W~Y¢>f~:· ~bjS:;:>,',
/ ~ ~ / ~', ~ > > > ~ ~ .,»~: ~ _,'> ~~ _ > ,V l • > > >.'~> ,', >'< . »:-~>~:'.>.> >->-~».< .'<., . >, »~~',••,',' ',', v',',
.~fQrm,¥PrQ~¢~'t~::$~~~siIi~·:~riariee:CQst$ in4~sc,t#ni~i~I~;~~g~ate$::~~'fili~pe:CQS~,':'
f~tra~~.¢,~n-Y;';dfff~~~~tpo\V:er ,Qontracts Wi~b6~t ~f:fe6ti~~l,y Q;isti~gut~i~i~~:>th~ ~:tr~e: it$~--
~ >~ ~ • > ~ > " ~ <~ > > ~> : ~ A' V ~>~» > , < > ,~ _ ~
, .
cnar~~t~f~S~ci:s ot,e~~lic9~trac~.~~nn: rhe:r~"are::a:4~i~~Qftal',$~Q~~ri!g8J.~::~s '~PPf~a6h
which will he, Qt;:co.me manifes;t when :the .results for the. lease ana:ly:~isof ,~tjlity A ;ar~:,
.~ >- - ~.~ ~ < ~ ~
VI. _IMPLICATIONS FOR. RATEPAYERS
~ _ ~ >' > " • _ ~ > > , A. > ~ v
The results pr~~nted. in Figure 1 are_ ,the incr~mental ,J ~ ye-at 1~~~i~~9, boudy
< ~ ~ <;»'~ > :>,' ~ ..,.,. > vv~> . y: . .. >~> ., ••/- : > ~ > :< > > ;" ~v: >••~> > < '~. > A > ~ ~ .- .,.>~ v'-_',·"
production cost d.ifferelltials '-in $tMWH for,uttllty>'buiJt geiter~tiotl and Nun:power
~:: A./ • > > <.", • ~ ~ ,. A ~ »~ ~ A ~ ~ .' -, > ~'/."~. - > > ~ > >. , > ~ ~. A _ >. ~'> ,.'
purdiase~:bas¢d qn ¢Q~ttact'~pe.30 These- ~O$ts ¢an ~j~(),nipar~~t~Q ~'~~effj~i,~n~r'~(j~~~t
" > " •• > ~~ > ~;~ ,.:." ./: ~ ~ ~~, ~. :-:"< "~> ~=> "':~. ~> ~: >: ,~: ~ :>', ~~ ~, =:: : :1' "
with no en~rgy or h!lanCe in.~rerne1)'ts correspong~ng., t~ op~~mal ~~f~ci~n~y -:9f ~~~gy". ,
~~< " ~ ~,: ~ '::',' ~ > • ~ < '~ ~, ~~"" , : ~ , ~<": A _ ~ ~ .:.> ~ ~, -- ~ > > > •
production and no risk to the purchasitl;g llti;1ity. The total inc'~~,~~~:~~l:- co~t~ > ~?f
$5~211MW,H for -the non-dispatc-habJe CQutracts'are comprised of,a$1.38/MWH finance
c.()st anq a $3.:83-ilYfWh enetgy 'proc.l~CtiOll cost. ,Botlfth,e ~tlergy and fin:atJce ,~osts it1c~ase
in real d.ollars over the 15 year period as NUG's comprise a latgerportion oftbepower
- , < ~ ~ ~ ~, /~ ~ ~ ~
supply mix for Utility A.
36LevelilieQya}ues were determined using a, 10% dis~Q~rLt rine for th~ ~~9a1 ,e~~rgy ~o-sts sbow~,i~ Table 4






v ~ > ~ ~ {" > ,v v _ v v
Figure 1:, Debt analysis _based on Utility A's financial and, ener.gy -data
With a total: jnGr~me.ntal ~ost-of$Q.9?MW.h, B:~ic Dispatchab)e _contrac~>provide a
v v ~> <., ',~ < ,. » • < ~ ~> v -~>_> • A A
sub~t~ti~lcost ~(;tvan~agel* excY$'~, 9'r:$41MW~,,()\Zer~o~:i"4i~Ptl~~b~~~e:-~o:.n~~p,t~:~.;;U:~like
~ ': > ~ ~ ~. > ~>.- v.~v~ / ~ > > ., >',.' »~' > > < > ~ > ~ ~.: > ~ ~. > > v> '. A •• > " :::." V
v
• ~. "'
the ~on-4i~p~~t4~~~e:'c9ntr~ts, >~e ~p~rt~t incr~me~t~: costfor the di~pa1Cliaple:cQnttacts
are ,~ttripl,lted ~Q fi~~:c;~ cb~g~s, r~fl~~ti~g ~~~ cQ~~.a?~~$ 9:pedttil!~J~ffici,~n~y:>:it:l ~eetl~g
'electric -load. r~~ ACEP:':Fonttact'h~~ t~e_lowe~t:>:~pst >:c;omp~4 tq·_qfher 99~tract
mechanisInswith a total c~st of $O;5:2tMWh. AU ,the'j~osts,asso,cj:ated- with- the ACEP
'_> :'" A>~~» ~',' "_>~»~' ~. ~~~.> " ~~~ " A ~ ~ -~ e ,.', ~ A A ~ > ~l~~ ~>~ ~ ~~
con~~ct are.:attri~u~agJe to ~~~tio~al;,fj~anQechar:ges~ -be~9'use iL~~~s e~~ctJ;i:c lqad:as .
effi:~ien~y.as u~lity ~owlled an.d Q~rat~¢ _power,~,and.,.cp~stAAllJently., .th~j~ QP: ~~~rg:y' :cost
," ~ , _ > • > • • A >: . _ ~~ . > -> , '" / • ~ ~ _ ~ / _ A < >>,. ~ _', > - - ) > > _ >' >
differentiaL
': V~~~g· ~~~:. ~~ig~~~4 JP/~~g,~ .CQ~t:P:f ~~p~t~",f'f.?~ /V~H~~~: ·ft:.; {l)lbl~-:,l}~·~:~ytY;:.-hltj~~"
generation results in a finance cost differential ,of ,$,P,.84/MW.h. C"Qmpari~g ..t;l:1;ese
incremental costs with ACEP contracts, utility built generation results in roughly a two
thirds higher incremental cost to rate payers. Furthermore, the N-UG has the potential to22'
achieve,additional·competitive advantages throughimproved fuel utilization efficiency (e.g.
using cogeneration).. I~ additi9~-;~9.tn~$~ ~aJculated costs,.~dvantages, A~ap ~9ntracts do
':~?:»:~:: :<' >:>:y~>~» ~;'>:~»>A~ "~:<:~ A>.~ :' ~:~::~;::~' »">:::>~ <,~>,._) ~:>~::::~: :~_ v'.:
notplape,the.full,rislcof-plant,availability:and· constntctiotl:·oost,o;ver--mns"Qft:me rate payer.
Thus, the rat~ p~y¢r~$:\tmesless risk with ACEPcontracts ata lo~,er::c()~t~~~>utUity built
" '
generation. '.,
Analysis of the 'finance costs can be extended to iUumin;~t¢:'~h~;:~f'~tof:a more
leveraged capital structure on t!leweighled average cost ofcapimL~~~~~!ltbepm..fax
attributed to':disl>atchable contracts results in incremental finance('c'osts for Basic
~ ~~ ~ N "
Dispateha~}e ~nd ACEP contr(l~ts'respectively of$O.651MWb and $O.521MWJ:1 c.ompared
~ ~ ,"·>:-»0' : ','"' >,~ >~». ' .~ , ~ ~ - >~~. •• ~ ~,. ,. ~
with the $1.38fMWhfor non~dispatchableGontrMts"
Tbe.'exteri!fat:debt'6f~e"dfsp~tchabteco~ttatts~-inereases'the:'~verage"bflJtiiity 'A,'but
also :ies,~lt$::i~;:;~~dtig¢~!:fi~~¢~; .Cpsts~,;66fu~~~~,~~9:ritlllt~f~~ilt,··g¢~~~ati~n (ass:i;t~~g;~he
> , ",
capitalstntcttiteremains c()nstant). In :tll1s\1ase~ the MUG; becomeS·the:agenftdtshifilng
'UtilitY,·A.1<)';'t:mote:'efflcienrc.apiiM, str9~tQt~;' 'This· i~~¢~t~:s th:at ~~¢: qti1#y' cou~<i ~h~pete
more favonibly~~nsi;i NUGbybeeommg!hore hlglilylever;iged. The dilrk solid line in
Figu~~,Z::i11~~tt~(~the'effect oitjillity:A u»de~atdpg;:aij4tttonaI~leverage ;wm¢~ sbtfts:the
weigllted::aVerage' cbsf:of capitiH :io tne:':-rignt ':aIo~g ':trrt{:toS{ 'cif b~piial cowe: 'The
dis:patehable:.ctintfacts:addthe:apptoptiate :am{),Ul~t 'Qfl¢vetageto bring:.the"ritllit)r clQs~t 16"
the min·imum. On the other h;lnd, if the NUG -force~ the utility to be.come too=·'1nghlY:':,;':
leveraged.St):-mat- the:~osi:otcapital itIcr¢~es~:the utjlity,-'shouldc6nside{i$suing e'lwtY to








ACBP '~aS:ic :j)ispatcl1ab~~, ,,:'
» ~~ ~ ~ />',,'~'.:_1~~
,,-: , %:t¢~ci~ge , ',;',
'Figq:te,::i: Errett :6f Le~erage 'ori" th~ Co~: "or' c~pi:t~l "
Forexample,,the non-mspatCl!able contracts increase lJtility A's leverage to the point
, : '" • > • ~ , : ~ ~ ~ ~ > .~< ,'" ~ : > < ~" > ~ : > A
where the indi~~ct>fin~c~ costs are gr~at~r ~llan tqe,iQ(;re:meQtal financ~ cQs~ of tb~,utility
~ A ~ ~ > : ~ A~_' ~ i' -' ~ • ~ ~ > >. ~, > > >~ ,'. ' ~ ~ > > ,•• ~-.~ > ~">
building its own generation. U~Hity A can minimize t~e p~t~tiaUY detrim:ent~l~frects Qf
: > ~ ~ > : • > ~ > < - '/ ~
pow~rpurchase contrac,ts,on its cost,ofdebt by adjusti,ng its capital s~cture ~ougbdebt
issu~~es t!)a~unt fo;~e~~ 11,~biiilles. . .. . ,. '.' ," .'
':>Y>
The cost advantages ofACEP power over,utility bt;Jilt generation adds credence,to
~ .~ - > ~. A' . ", -' ~ A:: " .,~.: ~ , ~ ~". > '.. ~
assertio~stbat ~orn;peti:~;y~ ele~tri~ po~er lllarke~s, ~~~ benefit;f~te :pJlye~.:, The~e t:~s~lts
A~" : »»~_.,"> ',',> >~.A> V.>; :V. A ,;"., ,." - ~. ,
also show that regu~ators and,utjlities sntfl;l,ld evaJ;u,ate, the m¢ts ofNUO CQntr~cts, ~ll, tenus
. : ..: " '~;:<>' , ,,'. >,/ "v' ~_ ",' ., > ~ '. ' > >. ." : > :::::. .' - - - w'", •
ofthe ~P:lic~~io~s on creditrating llS'We-11 >,~ (he:,~ir~c;t ep¢rgy',c6sl~'. )~ff,9rtss~~ld ~~Q, ~
> > ~ > ' " ' " : : • > A - , A. " • , >> • A,' > ~. ~>. • - " ~ > v' •• ,v_ V".· <
made to neg<?tiate con~acts th;at,provide rate p:ayer~ with>tne,>mo$~>~,f~cient,u~e0rNUG
purehas.es. Otherwise, the p,o:~e9:~i~~ ~~s~ saving~,of Nl!G, PQW~t :~~ ~~ily be '~cyst'to
• , ~. ~.: ' ~>' ~> • ~ > ~ ..._ .,,' ,- • > v > > ~' "', ". _ • < A': A
contract inefficiencies. The debt analysis also serves to highlight the importance ofthe
capital structure 'on electric rates and the potential advantages ofincreasing leverage.
Finally, as competition for building new capacity intensifiest37 utilities may be forced to
move toward a more highly leveraged capital structure to remain competitive.
37Due to the Energy Policy Act of 1992.24:
2. LEASE ANALYSIS OF COSTS
As discussed earlier, the le~e-atlaIysis employs the buy/borrow versus }¢as:efinance
model to determine the cost of utiUty built lWneration· ve£sus purchased pb'iV~.··l'~is
corres-ponds to a high risk situation where an increas,e in electric rates ~ould drive
c~~r~oft~~isteil). Although UtilitY A lSllotbeinsuchavulnerable condition, such
an anflly~isprovides i~s~gfitil1to-potential cost difficulti~s. These>-c-()n~itions:r~presenta
higher than .nOt1J1a1' exi;ttng risk»f~i :tne-utility where t~eAmpact»-Q{~ddit~(n~a1c.apacity
:~~~r~!~I::!E~~~!:::~:~==::w::~~:·
siIUult~ mcreasei:r~~e~()~ts iotbtlliiy~ ~~e~~scanbe attributed totbe
incre~~ed"~jsk- or- utiHty A IS abint>y' to p~y for debt aht.f:Nud corit~act obli~ati~hs'-> ~The
-leaSt(:aha:iysi;~-pt~~ides:::a_:t:omprehe-risive: :rhe:thod> of ,c~s:t comp:ati~6ri> ~t~~:e:il NUO- -
purchases -Yer~us:titility>bUl:It' gen~r~tidn illtd'-d6~ >n~freq~ire> ~ff"balance; sfi~t:adJustment~.
$fnp~:;:t~e-l~ridetri~titat (i~paG:ity >aad.ii~pn:s :costn':~' sa:ri1eLb~~we¢n:NitiG and ~lllity b~iit
gen~i~;th~dif~eirl finance rostShigIDignith~¢ffedsoichimgingthecapttal
stnittlite:fQf a-h~gh»ii$k\ltl1ity. -Tij~_ ~eaS~--:a4a1y;i~ ;r€Sujt~: ~~~sented i~: F~gu~ ~ si1:ow a
s:U:bst~tit~r=i:ttct~aS:~\~-;l~ditect>f1nan¢t ~co;s:ts totfh~:NU(fpurchaSes rrt;Iil'the debt- ~§isi~.
~-4-an' :~~a~Hprt~d: tis-k- P~~J:irrt-:t>{$1:40lMWh, -¢~~fi tQ':brith NtJGs-- -~~4 P;ti~i~y A.
Inc(eri1entalen~rgy&dsts.temairi i1~Chari~.iIhOlll the ·~eni·.JiaiY&is. Theln¢~metttkl
finarick c,i~t':Ot-$5-~2iiMwfi't6t NU(l>ca~a6itY purcbaSes:-sho~~>'in Figure 3-refl~~ts' the
f1ft~hY6M lev~lli~-d t~St ditftrerice:~~e{utllitY'hl1Ut' g~n~h~tiori.j8
" • , " > ~ >' ~ >' v> >
38Prom a financial analysts perspective, the NUGcontracts have zero incremental finance costs and Utility
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Figure 3: Lease analysis based on Utility A's financial 4nd energy ~ata
The significant disparities between the cost of Utlli:ty built generation ·and NUG
, '
~ - > >
purchases indicate that Utility A has assumed a highly leveragedcapital structure through
:NlJy :p~f¢lt~~~~~;. \y~~ll:the ~i.?,ci:;;t cq$'~'of' tbe':in¢r~ment'aL~p~9ity_ additio~$jd~ntiGal
betwee»Wq~d·iilifitYlrourc~s,~ed!ffere~ceil1 ~~ilrtqe costsilhr~tJ'l\1~ thepo~ntialfor
the ~ti~~ty :t~ a~j~st,its,capit:al struct~re to redu~~,;c~~ts:. IQ~;9rd~r to reQ:uce .th¢;.9i{f~(ential.in.;:,
finance;'c·()st$ betweel1NUG and utility buil~"ge~eratjo:n, the utiHty may c~nsi:d.e(-lssUing
ad~uO:~~:~~~t~:~aadi ~p~~~ha:$1ng ,(J~bt.,_,This-reduces the l,e~~~¢, ,QfVn~ity"A 'bt~ught()n
by ~,Q'J~ur~~¥~s>at1~ ~~;tlg,$~ ,w~igb~<;l,ay~r~~~'c~t.Q,f~apitaltoward>W~>~u:m>,af
the ~urve,sho\V;~jn,r:igm-e 2.> <Howeye£,>-i$suip.:g:eqQity'fot,'4~:b~: ~pUfQhase;.may dH~te: tbe'
valqe»of;~;~§:ting; shates:~ bu~:jt-:WolJ;ld,prQyide,a:p~~{mU~I¥ ~re,&tahle c:~pital,'SthJeture:;' A:n'
equj~yj~u~t;~; :m~Y>J~e;:~t~Je~a~e::t9: ~l:-JI~gh le:y~{~~~ ~i>~~~~~!:l ::wi$::a=;lJ:igb; ,c~st:,qf d¢,b:tlf:: ',: ''-
equity bo1qets receive.:less,than tht? ~10wed rate:-Q~:retun1 in,Qrderto keep'-~lectric,tates l{}w~
Altlfough the lease c;tnaly,sis provides a rigid,and-consistent financial,s't.ructure and
removes the potential subjectivity associated with adjusting off·balance sheet liabilities for26
Utility A, the structure has,the short c6hllng ofoverlooking an important rationale ofutility
acc~?~[lY~~,'>> !11~ ,~~;'itm~~~ :Oc(~:~l<tp~i~;~~~:~s>:~jba$~>~6~:t~~ti(jU$ ¢ffectlv:ely:ignQres the
regUlatory entitlement of Utility A to recover NUG capacity pity~ents t1}foogh its, ,fuel
adjustm~~t~la.~se,. or ~y other accounting mechanism. Furt~~~/t~jaseanalysis
~ • >~ >> -:~ , ,> >
fails to aocount'tdr th~::hsks ass.ociated with the efficiency of:~~.,,~¥~?~f::c~#fract. It
puwbilses'powetfrom NUQs~ witt{an ACEP tq~i~¢t




"~., >~. ~ > >~ > ~A> " ~ ~ ~ ~v~ v > > _
direct" ~osts:of:geiieratiofi~ these' concerns are, d~~ate(fby C0!lCernS o~e~::mai~taftiing
c~~pany:,eaniitigs :without 'in~uff-in~;>:additi()nal'risk. The risk ass~iated'with bUilding
l~g~'base~loa.d, generatiQni~" ~i~wed'by:fuany sh~eItold~~$ as e~eesslt-e lorcurreri{ aIlo~ed>
, 'fates,of t¢tutti~ Acqwsi~iQn :pfdispafuhable::NUG resoutces; provides:'·a: \tiable:;:~t~rh~tt:ve' ; "
for :meetittg"'electt:ici load wtthput:ihcurring> the fisks;:of'developing new' :Utility.:pl~,nts.
Furth¢rrn(ji:e:, to- the "e~~ent;:-:tharN:tJ!(l pu:rohases proVide'''}6wer, cost:electric ptiwef;:a
competttive"adVgnta~e' is:,·obtained.: ;In:t~~ieins with-"slQW electri'd' -load:;:~r6Wth~N:tJO
pUJ"cb~~es ':can:':he:'>viewea::,as >¢r~~ng a, tit1UtY~:s :e.lec~fc" :t~~e>':lYa~e.f'~s ,,:existIng''plants
depreciate..,; As(tottipetitian:inereases in:,the>bUlkpower'market, a :utUitY:f~fabiUty to";provide
competitivtrservices becomesthe, foremost factor. :An even handed analysis ofthe't6tal27·
costs of put.chasing Nl!G po·wer -becomes the most effective: fueans::o:t:fiiaintainihg
competitiveness and preserving a customer base.
2. ",NUG'S-'PBRSPECTlll/l,
The four basic economic stru~tures ~or p~rchased power from NU9:~ proyide
~ • ,~~ > >:: .,: ~ :~~: ~ <' > ~, <, 'A ~ • ~ N ~ ~ A~ ~ A , ~ ~>~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _,:, :A ~ > ~. >
different risk/reward relationship to the N-UG. The Flat R:ate contra~t and On-PeakJOff-
- ~ >,' ~ ~~~: ' > >' > • > , ~ ~ ,', ~ ~ .~> > : > ~ ~> ->~
Peak contracts encourage the'NUG to maxim1z~ electric ot1tPtl~. Additionany ~ these
>.: A
V v->~; >.> A > ~~ .:~ /: ~ :': : _ = " . ~ v' ~ > v ~ ~ A ~ > v ' ,~: ' ~ ~~»~ ~ v > ~ = ~; ''v> vV: ;.,~ ~ > >: v ~ ~.,' .-
c'on~~t$-,.often-,~quir,¢,.the'.NUG·to,<acqept·sjgnifican:t :risk ~n,<fqture'ye~~':~~¢<rates:of fuel
.~, .~» ·A>~ Y~~, ~ . »~-> : > A > > / / A:' ~> -. • > ~. ,'~ _, ~ -:. .~~ r '> ., -;
'eS9'~~ti~liartdpl~t'9p¢ta~o-ft':and ~iiln:te:~ancecQst~,~~L9ivetgJ·fromthih~Qn~~act-p~~e~.
~ ~: ~ , ,. ,,:-,< : ' ~ ~ , .. " ~ ~ > ~ , ,
Th~' 'fittant~:~~tl' PQtnmtl~ity 'is' p~~'qlatlY se:nsitive, to .~os.t, 'rz:py~r~g~ ri:~ks,: "~~ ~etghts
~ ~'~~~~, > > • >' , ~.<~ /::~:<'. .. .~ '::.:' ~A ~ _ ~~,
he:~~ny' the. a6ilitY-10 ,maintain a':'pos=itive relatians'hip' betweefi' power sale pfi,eesand
~ ~ . ~", ", ~/~
~ ~ , ~
production costs in evaluating NUG proj:ects.39 However, these contracts are easy to
~ _. ,/ ~.._~ ',~ ~
understand andrepresent a broadly accepted and well und~rst90d ri~.
: , , ~. '": ~" ,,- ~' ~",
On the other hand, the Basic Dispatch-able and,ACEPcontracts provide little risk of
" ~ , • ~ , >
, ~ > ~
diverging rates ofescalation, but are not as well understood by ~e financial community.
/ ~ i~ ~ _ ; < ~ _. ~ ,; ~ >
contracts are less than the ~ther contract forms. In additi.01l:, ~he NUG oper~tor is
, ~ > - A ~
fiJ::t:anchllly indiff~rent to the Qpef'lting level. The NUn a~hieves'profit maxitUizat-ion
~ , , , , , ~ ~, ~' ~ , . ~ ~~ " . ~ ~
through maintahiing the highes:t p'Qssible availability level, not maximizing p~oduction. ~
• ~ ~ ,,~,. - ... - y / ".; (
addition<~<the'NUG is lik~iy to view lowe~ production C\'~ -1o~erplant wear or in Qther words
/, > __ ~ ~" ~ ~ ~ ~A:: ~ ~ > -
assetpreservation. Theeconomic impli~a~iQnsofthe powercontraet are designed to match
fuel and operational costs andreduce the risk of a cash,flow deficit, e:nhanci~g a project's
, ~: ' :.~ . , , , ~ , -~ . '.' ~
competitiveness and Hf11lancabilityu.
, ~ / ~ ~
39001dsmith et. aL (1991).C<;>mpetitive electric rate~'and 11iglfcredtt rating~ ~e :p~ssible fot"titiliti~~ with power
purchase contractsifthey are designed .to reduce a utility'sliabilities:and: tninimi~s::energy
costs. NUG purchases under efficient power contract mechanisms can have a lower cost
~. . ~
th~ utility 'b~ij:t ge~eniti~~'. "1r~diti~~~ pr~d~;e-~d ~y ~~~~~a~ts f~~l 't~ i~te~~te the
conita~:tea re~pur~~ ~fficiently' int~ the e~is~~:~"power.,supply mi~' .~~' toad~~s the
conce~s ~f"ili¢'fin:ahcia{c6~unity. Fla(Rate' ~d 'On~peaklotf~P~ak contra~~s 'lack
·:=~:7:::l~:~~~:!ti~~;et~t:;~;~d::~r1tft~~:::::····
.' »> > i • ,_' >
(f\d:El»>;soritt~¢~~::~eie::~h6~:::~~::pttivide sig;mficmji:~t~ti9mic :an~::~~r~~ing ,advari(~~e~:'
> > ".,
over n"ori~d:i~p~tchable c~ntrf:t~ts. ACEP ,contracts ~chiev~d ~:ptim~i re&o~r~e ail~~~ti~~>
while reduO:l~g, utilitY andrate payerrisk.
Criticisms 'of<Nl}G":-putc~sescan,:genera:lly' b~ traced.to4he: form.,of,,~ontract ':~sed
, -,
, "
(e.;g. non-dispatchable) or'the'associated'risk premiums'that res:U1t'in a higher,cost ofdebt
for' fh~ ,~ur~h~~i~g l~~i~hY:~' Fr~m ~n, eC9:I,l,omic pe~p~<::tiv~~, ~e ~n~~sis tr~t~:d -t~e, ~t~al
> A '\ ~» " " > ~~ ~ ~ • > ~ ~ > ~~~' ~~
inve~troe~t ttfade inh~W generatlngcapae)iy' as the satn'¢'in altc~es:re,gardieSs 'of the,()~t1er
ortype ~f coritra(;(~'p~ified. Insi;tuations whe~e th~ utility ,could a~hieve a lo~e~';e~hted
~ - ~ A -
utilities), an ~clip 'c'ontract ~~Y achie"ve a co~ped{ive advantag~',over utility :b,9ilt
- ~ ~ ~ /~ A > ~ ~ ~ ~ /~
generation 'tfuough utilizfttgamorelevehlged <capital ~trntt~re. 'Fro~ the rate'-payers,
, ,
for the new capacity addition. With ACEP contracts being oPer,ated'as efficiently ~' ~tility
ownedeapacity~ theoverall conclusion is that ACEPcontracts for NUGpurchases can be
economically efficient. Hovvever, the same example also shows that non-dispatchable
contracts increase the utilityls leverage beyond a costeffective level and result in a higher
weighted average cost ofcapital than utility built generation.Fota utility that is alr~ady in an unustJ~lyrisky financial positi~~:>NUG:purchas~~
may be tre:ated::ai l~ased··ca:pac~ty rather th~: external debt. tws in~reases' the utility's
leverage so much ;that utility built generation appears to be~option withthe lowerfinance
costs. An alternative would be for the utility to offset the increased leverage of a NUG
purchaseby issuing equity. However, shareholdersmay objectbecause of dilJti~~'of iliei~
stotk:. The-standard procedures' used' for -Iea~ing ign~~:th¢)oe:al' '~jiiei~1)~~$ iti' riS~' :~d
operati~g costs of,dispatchat~le~~~trac~s'oyer,bo:n..dispatchable ,?~p:ttact§. C~)1t:S~qu~~tly,-, ..
~ > > : ~ ~ ~ > ~ ~ > ~ > > > > >~ - > - ~ ~ " .~ ~•••;..,.. v' v v _ >~ < I ~ /- ~. ~. ~ • ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~. ~ •
l~as~,~~)tsi$:.m~:¥atttthut~,:t~.mueh,risk-W.:Ntr;G,:t;apa~ity' with·-no-.ri~kb.enefl~$::~ttri:h~ted­
to 'di~p~t(i~_aljl~:'versq~ -no~di~p~t~able ;CQn~~~ •..,This w;i;ll p¢ex~nsi:ve::fm-'-r~te p~yeJs. ,
_~ '> ~ ~: ~> > ~> ~ A >~ ;: ~ ~ • > Y A >'>~ ~ >': > ~ >~. < ~,. ~ v > ~ ~ ~ > v"> ,. A <>~ ~ - > YA~/> Y ~ ~ ~ A' • ,.
" > ~>A~~~9'wl~~gm~:~:t$"" ,
• > ••• ,~» •• ~ >_'v, .~.>:~~>~>" »~>~>.
~e at!rf?o~swould '~y,to th~ Jerome, H~s ~~ ~em~~,N~~~JQr, Qleir Q~lpful
>, V" " >: ~ ': ~ , ~~ ~ ~ > ~». > ~ -.' ~ ~ '.,' ~ > A >~> •• > > i - > f >.: • > • > • > > > " '-
comm:ents.
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The ~odel c:aleu~ates the inc.remental Variable ,~:o~i 'd~~f~reQ:~~~ between en~rgy
production under-different eo(1tract forms. lJle incretttentat~o's:t~ "W¢~$:urethe hQurly
d~fferenti~ ¢~~tgy, pr04ucti.~n ,C{)sts ~~tween tb¢,. 9:tUity ~Y~~~~:J~b4.a:::with,a,nd..witbollt
NUG :geJ1:~t;atioll ... T~~ utility-:g~ner~d()n ..only> ~as;e ll1itititains::~the :s~~~ cap<wity ~~v~las
tile NUG,c~~s .~d a$SU~~~, the' u~~itY, operates the saijl~. tyP~;-Q:f.,faCi~t~y &S"tne?NU(js.
The ev~thl,aJioll .oLeach rgU9 can:~~?t. was do~e :as~uI;r;tiQg tbat 'tH'j··~th~f tYpes 6{ NU:G
~~Wt~~~r;:d~=~:l~t ~tilf:rt£iI~AA4r~p~~~~~1l~wan~Y~!;.Of
·:!~~iiiIS'~:!l'tili:iill~itl!t!
lambdaforeach time block suIn:riied':overthe. e~tire week ancfmen. t~iy:~qed by the':t;tnmber
ofhours jn.,tlle week. The'time blockr@thod p#)Vide{ins~h(Jht6' ftii(hours 'of'the ,week
a NUG ~onlrf,tc;t}uay .jncrea's~ ene'rgy production cost,s.' li'>addi~#~~., the (U)~lyst can
eVallJate 'the effects of 10,minute spinning res:etve between the e'ac~. '~ontract::typeand
utility built.gener~tion. Th~ c.O:sts of,1:0 minute ':sp~:nning,.~sefV~. t¢e ift:GPrpora.rep.'jnt-o the
analysis._ ,.
In s:u.rntnary, the EPCM acts as a least cost dispa:tch;:model. :The incr~m~ntal
variabl~, ,~:tlef,gy ,procuti<),II co~ts are. dete~min~d for future,,y¢ars ~p-4::then ,levelized to
',d~t~~:tie:·a::~:5'y~ar ~n~rg~ cosj. . , " ., .." .,
financial Cost Mogel
>tlu~ :pjn'aneial ,Cost MQdel JfCM)- '~al¢:u1::#es tiW :iiu:iii;ecf ¢():st~, aSSQci~ted :with
NUG'purchases which are determiil.ed from Jhe ~ircrease(ji cQ~~: of issQ;~~gnew q~~t.. The
,Fc:¥ ,applies:, ap ·~nualij$k p~ettiiu:m, 4i$up-~;~¢:(} itt $.¢¢li(.)~; l~t:-#~~)tbe at,u;iu,~·'-:d~ht
,issu:~c¢~:f9t Uti~1:~y.;A'. .T~~,ll~od~~t:dr' 'tb~' ,~*:~aJ d~~t:j~s.~~~C¢~:::ij#d ii~l~; ;:p~~~lj:m
:e.qUaIK ~h~'fin~cial' penalty.. Tftis 'p~aUy ~~. q~ed for the' e.ntire:~u-t~ti.g~'o-f?llie:qebt.
Debt duration follows .th~ samepattem,that Util~ty A c~ed fro~ ,~9.~Q:.~o 199€k '
The total amo~nt of debt:i~s~ed ~ach Y~~.r .is,.~~l~ .~~*~t~~tfr~~1991' ~t?ugh ,:'
1993, but es¢~~hites'at"l%fr~m 1994"tlfrOugb';OO5..The·ris~,ptefuiumonly app:l~¢s to
debt is-sued ~ter 1991. The fisk pten~um:r;~ge~ ft9m, (j tp;JoP basiS points. ,;;;'these .,
values are determified by an annual debt:adJustiJIent factor tQt) '~meh places in,'a 's~anei
portion ofthe NUO,capacity: paym~nts as off;;b~ance sheet de~t~ . .Table A1 m;:rjvatio:n"~l' h,~reme:n:tal,En&rgy 'Prodtretlon :C~$t:8





Case 1: Flat Rate and On~p&aklOrt·peak at ¢6IkWh wi,tIl- 60% coml':nUted to ,c(lp!1city payment
case 2: Dispatch bas~ on P:rls3( heatrate curve
Case 3: Aotual Energy Cyct& D~patctl: , "
This analysis ooncems the h1cr~~ltal a~ergy ooSt~fr~~~:p~~~~1t:l9<a~ a(fditlOn~ MW,'~~: NUG el~lfl~ty~un~r<~9,~::~riJ~~~t;lQr:ffl) ':- :"'~
The analysis does nO{ JncJude ttle.'lt\cr,~i:ri~,taf bal'f~fJt$,::9f~~f.i;>tg:ratapayars: tor::~~~qj,ty surpIU~~.~r~~fiqJ,f;)f(ate$:J~ulriri:~r1I'orrd,~tl$' pUrChases: '
This is eqUivalent to me&ting ~'~ s:~~d;'syst~ :rE!Se~e;: r~q'4!r,e~rEmts with-:nc{:$ur:Pfmies -Qr de~l~ei9s fn ,capaclti:~:'>
1 MW Proxy fA 1990
.. \11& otcap:' ":, "i;~' ot~ti~~::::::~~:#tj~:?p;:>' c::~:: "', ':-:=" ':( ~9'~t1;m~ %,;<}J:~ap'.
t~t~",: "as 10 Min. [)Qtt~ c, ,[Xf(fa::,, aSji;(Mifj=;"", " .~ ',' :,pe:ita::;: ;:D~tta as' to Min,
W09kciays Timet?f P~r ,,',' ,)~ , $fl?~~rt", $l:MWH:.. ,1\: 'I~S ,,<:~.,~>., .. :$:I.F>.i:trt,:,:: >:' .$!MWH;::, :'Ap Has $~P"..
~:Partitfon A 10-19""',45::' '4<()..%$'~', Q';. ::1'60:0;q.-' . "<0:::0· .. $',Q;:: "f<"f: '<" 0- ,'foo~/<t 0: 0
'Partltton B fl.9. 2Ot~~" ,. 2~,O% '$~26:' 0:' ·16ci.~" \9;9:: "" "'$;~:. :::~}~ :::'~:;: }100-% 0:0
Partition C 21-23, 7 2:0 20.0% '$,6~ 0.5 40:%, "Q--.:Q;, $4:~ ,I * ',0;, :,'100% 0,0
PartltiOI'lD 23·7 'ff{) , >2'0.,.0% $16:9 t: '40% ' ':-,,0:0" ,'-<$::1:6.:,:1 'f' '0" ,100% 0.0
Week'Hlds ':: ,i t ',1000'/a
Partition E 8-20 <2'4 5' e~,.O% ,·20,.0% $.77 f 40% o.~. ':'$:1:0' >! 1 0: "tOOO/1I 0,0$0'
,ParUtiQl."l F 1-7, 21·-24 :'" _2:4.:: 5 :' ;., ' t()'o~6;%', ,,:-~,(1.()~t.. : $1~~' 1:" ", 4;0-%:': ::j~;;q: $t~: :·t!: .0:,:, :'1:00% <to ~J?,.. ,t
total , 1;.fHf· ''',< t~:ittt$IWk "$46:$ 'total$rYik: ':'$:~;9:', ':,' " t:cit'~t$:lwt: $:0
, , " 't:~laf$tyr ,$:2'4:':~~64 to~~~t:~:tvr-;" '~~I~~J. ~;. ToJal:$/YJ': $.()





Debt Anary.r. Anntla,1 lncr.menb.~: Energy Produe,tlQn Cost,'
Year ,t9'9'f 19:9~ 19:93'" HH~'4 ':H~95 HJ:9:~V 1997 .'1 &9;~ 1:~:~:~:,";' ~:O~Q:tX ,: :2:001 2002 20032(104: ,209'$
NUG Capacity , lO21 1384 198~' 2J39 235:5 2J5$' ' 23'552355 2:3:55"" ' ;Z3:~:' " , :Z35S 2355 Z3&32<H2 2441
NUG Energy OWH 43{)4 151,6 10834 Ij457 15036 15420 15420 t5420 1'S4:~n,' f54iQ' ,15420, 15420' 15,605 15;792' 15.~82
NUG Cap Factor 0.48 0.62 0.6Z 0.12 0.73 0.7;5 0.75 0.75' (}'1~ "", '0.7:5 t):75 0.75 0.7'5 0.75 0.7.5
NUGEnergy Add OWH '9() 0 504 3716 1034 9657 rli~6 11620 11620 11:620, :" 1'1620:, H620 1(620 11'620 11805 IIWt'
UImlY Buill 0:00 0.00 0;00 ,0.00 0,00 0.00
Cost differenlials for Cares l·3a~ve ~ esClUatM as S~ frQJ'O',lbel~9(jenerjy con differentiltl vli:J.ues.
Energy Production Costs· ~nffer:enn~ds
Rat Rate &. On.PeakJOff.Pe.x 2:'9'1 },06












3.91 4.10 4s,i 4:~5;2: 4.75 4.9'8 5.14 5.30 5.47
0.33 0.34 0;36 O,,3~' f;>.40 0;42 0.43 0;44- 0.46
0.00 0.00 O,~, "0.00' 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.'00 'QJJO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00
FJrulnce Coat OlfferenUa1:, ' ($/MWH) ,
Flat R~ & Ol)lo:p~·p~ 3:.27., 0.61 0.47 {).4~ 0,.53 :J~,.~7: 0,83 1.·10 1.31, 1.~67. 1:.97,'
Basic Disp~~h~hl~ ...64: o;~i, 0.23 O.~'l O:?4: &3), 0.42 a.so' 0.63-; ,~P6' ,6.89,
ACE? ):31 0.2:7 0.19 0'.17 0.21' 0:27 0.33 0.42 0.51' O:&l 'Qj7l
Utility Bunt 1.37 0.7,3 0.90 0 ...75 P.7S 0.75"', 0.7'5 0.75 0:75 O,~15 Q.15
~,firnmee ~~:differentillls- in ~~i~·otSJMWn:ar~d;eteqnWe¢;f'1of,Jt:~~ 'tolal llnnl:J.d ftance';t:p;~ m'iided l;ly,:addiliolllU Nt}G energy:proooctr,£llls-in'C; I~X)'6::
It is.~d that:therearenofln,,"~'CQsts'~f .991 ~a~Gf~:att,~v~.y::~~n,Jmo~:~~:~VGcapacjty. ",,.,,
Consequently. itbecomes apptop(l.. eto,~varti~elhefmance:oosts»:in9'e~n~:from the :!:~11O~~.
2,29 2.~2 2.54, 2.67
1.04 i.OS k06 t,Q~,
0.8.2 0.83 0.84 0.86
0.75 0.7S 0.81 0.84
E:nergy"'.,'Flnanc..;OOst otfi.rentJalt ($/MWM)
Ftat'Rat~&<tJn;;Pe.akidff;,~:<, '6.19 :t13 3.68. ,3:80 4:;07' ", 4.39' 4.74 5.20 5.68 6.19 {t.n 7.28 7.56 7.84 8.14
Basic Dispalchable L8B Q.5.9 OSO ~:50 (};56 0.64 0.74 0.85 0.99 1.J4 1.29 1.45 l,48 1 ..51 (.54
ACEP' t3:1 '{):2;7: (};19 'd;17 '0.'2'. O.?,7 0.33 0.42 051 O.6;l 0.7:1 0.82 0.83 OJ.W O:~6
Utility Built 1.37 'O~73 0;00 "0.75 O.7S n."is 0.75 0.75 0:75 0.15 ~;75 0:75 0,18 0:81 0.84
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<"7':"':V:"'~""''''''':'''':'>'"'V'''''''''~U.7'''~'''''-<''7~'«",:","~'If-:r,,'f~'t'\!Z'~;::r-..~'!!;,'f;' ... '',''''~'''';''·::>-.. ~~"·<"«~~;~~",:;"",\~~,,, ... ,,,;~~"'~".,""r.. 'II!';"'<>""I~I~,"' ... "~~"i''''''''V'''>..............'r~~~"'t-"'>$~""I/"'lI"'f .....~ ~ :«:*.~.r(1f ........: ...... "".k .•, ... 1Y"f"..-:y....'~It:'tt ..~"'..·..·.,,::.<·,..·,.·..·..·...·,..·...:.<:« w:lIl:"":"'!t>.:fI."., ""..... '"'""'''''OIl loI'.:-otl""'~ ...,_..,"',,,..."'_.... ......._ ..... ~,__.,~__._.~,_.~....""""._.""~'•• A~'.~. ._._.._••_••_•••..•TableA3
Lea..,An'aly:,l, A~nij.1 :Inere:rt\.ri~t~f: Energy Pr()ducUon COIlS",
Year 1.'" ,J:$:!J.2, , 1.'" : 'rfg. :1::1:9:5:, 1,9:$:$: " 1'91 " 'nU~8 '1 ~~~ ..: 20:Q({' :iuterf 20Qa 20'03 2tHJ:4 a.O():S
NUG Capacity 1l;l~1 l~' f9&t ': :tt:l9', ,)l$$: ~:$5:-::"'< 2~55 ':Z"5 .ti5:$' "':1355::' ,f :.:21,5:.5 ' t355" 23SJ 2417 ., 244'1
NUG Energy OWH '4304 7516, 10834 J34:S7 t~Oi6 I~Q, , 1~'2(.1' 15420 J.542:ir '~:"I$42e ' ~:t:S~20 1S410 15;605 15:,:792 fS.9S2
NUG Cap Factor (};48 0;62 0:62- '~.72 "O:,?~ 0/1,5'::' 0.7'$ 0;75 0.15 " '0;15' '0;7S 0.15 0.15 0:15' 0:75
NUG Energy Add,OWH'90- 0 S&t 3116 '70..34 9657 H~'" Jt'6:20 11620 11620 '" ''U62Q ' J~t620 11620 11620 n:Sf.15 ll992
Energy Prod:nctlof\'Costs VtlTerentlats (S!:MWU)
Flat Rate &. On.;Pe-akfOff.Pe'ltk ~9t' 3~06 1.2:1' '-',37 :3-.$4 3.72
Basic Dispatda,ble &.24 O.2tr 0.27 0.28 :Q.30 0,,11':
ACEP 0;00 ,(M.lO 0,:00 ~LOO (tOt) 0:..00 '
Utilit.y Built O~OO' oj~' 0;00' "ci:~o;oo 0;00
COstditfermtials fOf CM'e$ 1.3'lbo;v~:;u.e',escal~as S%'fhifrl'~.tleJ~:~enetg:y,~st differeriii~':\'AI~.
< , , , •~. v. v , ~
3.91 4.10 4.31 '4.57 4:75 4.98 5.14 ,'.30 SA7
0.33 0,34 0.;r6: ,": ,~.3~F' '0~40 0.42 0.43 '0'.44 0.46
O~90 O,,()O O,~ ,,' -O.~; ~.9Q q,QO O;® o;.@ Q;~,











, ;.: l:2-2:<' "
,($IMwH) ,
5.43' . ,4.57 4~:7C;) 4S4-
5.4:3. . 4.$7 'A10 4,:54
":~~:"" :':,~:::::, "'<:~:'. ", :~::,~',,',
,M9' .J~;Z:'s' ".;.'f.19" : 1.24,': '
4.54 4.54- 4.54' 4.54 4~'54 4.54 4.11 4.89 5.08,
4.54 4.54 4.54 ,,4,54. 4:$4 4.54- 4.71 4;89 5.08
4.54 454 4S~: .:' >,~~54 4.;54 4,54 4.71 4.89 5~O8
0:00 6;00 O.OQ:... :q.OO:· Q:W 0.00 0.00 0;00 <too
1:24", .;, ' tt~4 i:':24: ·f:24·>' "t~ 1,24 1.29 1.34 LJ9
EnarID' & F'll:'ance CO.tOJtt~~enUal. ,
H~l: Ra!~, &. On.. :ff~llkIOff;-Peak '13.47 '8:72
Bl\$id)f$p~~~t~ ,10:.:10 S;~l
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